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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, dramatic political and economic events in Russia have
focused the world's attention on Russia's desperate need for foreign
investment. The tremendous economic dislocations caused by the precipi-
tous decline in Russia's trade with Eastern Europe and the dismantling of
Russia's command economy have led to the near collapse of the Russian
economy. Meanwhile, domestic and foreign investors hesitate to commit
vital investment capital to Russia until fundamental legal and political
issues have been resolved. Official bilateral and multilateral aid programs
promote foreign investment in Russia, but most such programs have
limited resources and have concentrated only on promising sectors such
as oil and gas. Ultimately, only private investors will be capable of
unleashing Russia's vast economic potential.
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The injection of significant amounts of private capital into Russia is
complicated by Russia's massive debt overhang. The Soviet Union's
impeccable debt service record did not survive the Soviet Union itself,
and Russia has fallen into arrears on principal and interest payments to
commercial and official creditors alike. The Paris Club of official
creditors and the London Club of commercial creditors have recently
completed rescheduling agreements to ease Russia's debt service require-
ments. Despite the reschedulings, many Western commercial banks balk
at financing any but the most lucrative investment opportunities, even
with official guarantees. Financing a project in Russia that does not
generate hard currency receipts is virtually impossible.
The debt-equity swap may provide a partial solution. Developed in
the mid-1980s as a response to the Latin American debt crisis, a debt-
equity swap is a process in which public or private debt of a developing
country borrower is converted into equity in an enterprise in the debtor
country. A debt-equity swap should not be considered a single, homo-
geneous, set-piece transaction, but rather a series of transactions that
result in the cancellation of a debtor country's foreign debt in return for
equity in the debtor country's enterprises. Each debt-equity swap program
is unique, as they must be tailored to the goals and circumstances of the
particular debtor country. Numerous variations on the debt-equity swap
concept have also been developed.'
This Note examines the origins, development, and mechanics of debt-
equity swap programs in Latin America before discussing the various
goals and policy considerations involved in formulating debt-equity swap
programs. Next, the Note describes Russia's debt situation and sketches
the outlines of a debt-equity swap program that will reduce Russia's
foreign debt while stimulating foreign direct investment.
I. THE DEBT CRISIS AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE DEBT-EQUITY SWAP 2
A. The Debt Crisis
In August, 1982, Mexico inaugurated the developing country debt
1. These include debt-for-nature, debt-for-development, debt-for-education, debt-for-trade,
etc.
2. For works providing good information on this topic as a whole, see generally 1 THE
WORLD BANK, WORLD DEBT TABLES 1992-1993: EXTERNAL FINANCE FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (1992) [hereinafter WORLD DEBT TABLES]; UNCERTAIN FUTURE: COMMERCIAL
BANKS AND THE THIRD WORLD (Richard E. Feinberg & Valeriana Kallab eds.,
1984)[hereinafter UNCERTAIN FUTURE]; Peider Ktnz, The Third World Debt Crisis, 12
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 527 (1989).
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crisis by declaring a moratorium on external debt servicing. For the rest
of the decade, developing countries around the world struggled to service
their external debt to commercial banks and official creditors. Investment
levels and economic growth stagnated as flows of private capital into
developing countries virtually ceased. Some developing countries are now
regaining access to international capital markets, perhaps signalling an
end to the worst of the debt crisis.4 Nonetheless, the debt crisis had
ruinous economic effects on the developing world and sparked vigorous
debate on the best methods of managing the developing world's debt
problems.
The roots of the debt crisis lie in the oil price shocks of 1973-1974.s
Commercial banks sought productive outlets for the glut of "petro-
dollars" deposited by newly rich, oil-exporting countries.6 This increase
in international liquidity and a simultaneous economic recession in the
developed world led to unusually low or even negative real interest rates,
which made external borrowing an attractive and inexpensive means for
developing countries to obtain necessary financing to cover the increased
cost of oil and other imports without submitting to the extensive condi-
tions required by multilateral development banks.7 Rising commodity
prices and export volumes seemed to offer developing countries a means
of repaying the external loans.' Under these conditions, the heavy
borrowing levels seemed sustainable, and commercial banks began
competing among themselves to offer the most attractive terms to
developing country borrowers.9
3. WORLD DEBT TABLES, supra note 2, at 41.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.; see Richard E. Feinberg, Restoring Confidence in International Credit Markets, in
UNCERTAIN FUTURE, supra note 2, at 3, 6.
7. See Feinberg, supra note 6, at 6-7.
8. WORLD DEBT TABLES, supra note 2, at 42.
9. Id. at 41-42. External debt of developing countries increased from less than $100 billion
in 1972 to over $500 billion by 1981. (Developing country debt to commercial banks grew
from $4 billion in 1970 to $127 billion in 1980. The Brady Initiative, WORLD BANK INFO.
BIEFS (The World Bank, Wash., D.C.), #C.02.8-92.). Although this six-fold increase now
seems imprudent, at the time it seemed sustainable. Developing countries' export prices
increased by 70% in the 1970s, resulting in debt-to-export ratios that increased only from 150%
in 1970 to 175% in 1980. Moreover, the debtors' rate of economic growth exceeded the real
interest rate of their debt, allowing them to borrow more without increasing their relative debt
burden. See New Ways to Grow: A Survey of Third World Finance, ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 1993,
at 64, survey at 8 [hereinafter Survey: Third World Finance]. By 1981, however, the six-fold
increase in debt greatly exceeded the doubling of Gross Domestic Products (GDPs) and export
volumes. WORLD DEBT TABLES, supra note 2, at 41. Debt-to-export ratios continued to
increase, reaching 250% by 1981, and climbing to 350% before peaking in 1985, when
rescheduling and declining interest rates reduced the region's debt-export ratios to 40% by the
end of the year. Bank for International Settlements, Recent Developments in the External Pay-
[Vol. 15:909
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Such favorable borrowing conditions did not last, however, and by
the end of the 1970s rising real interest rates 0 and falling commodity
prices and export volumes had forced several countries to reschedule
their external debt. 2 Nevertheless, commercial banks continued to
increase lending to developing countries, offering them lower margins and
longer maturities.13 One unsympathetic observer called the result a history
of "stupid loans by stupid bankers to stupid countries. ' 4
Eventually, however, the developing countries' debt servicing prob-
lems and alarming international economic indicators prompted commer-
cial banks to downgrade their credit ratings and virtually shut off new
lending to developing countries." Banks regarded the debt servicing
arrears as a solvency crisis, not as a temporary liquidity crisis for devel-
oping countries caused by global recession, a sharp drop in export
earnings, and rising real interest rates. The developing countries were
viewed as incapable of repaying their outstanding debt, and commercial
banks scrambled to reduce their exposure. Developing countries' lack of
access to new loans deprived them of their chief means of servicing out-
standing debt, thus precipitating the debt crisis. In August 1982, Mexico
declared its moratorium on debt repayment. Within two years, commer-
cial banks were negotiating with more than thirty countries that had fallen
into arrears on debts amounting to half of all developing country debt. 6
The massive capital outflows to service outstanding debt and the loss
of new financing and investment had devastating effects on developing
country economies. The 1980s have been called "a lost decade for
development,"' 7 as the lack of access to international capital markets
throttled economic growth and reduced standards of living in many
ments and Financing of Selected Latin American Countries, INT'L BANKING & FIN. MARKET
DEVELOPMENTS, Nov. 1992, at 16, 16-18.
10. The developed countries tightened their monetary policies after the second oil shock
in 1979-80, causing world-wide long-term rates to increase by three percent between 1979 and
1982, with even greater increases in short term rates. WORLD DEBT TABLES, supra, note 2, at
44. Rising interest rates caused interest payments to consume increasing proportions of new
borrowing, reaching one-third of new disbursements by 1981. Id. at 45.
11. Export volumes dropped by 4.2% between 1979-80 and 1981-82. Id. at 45.
12. In 1976, Zaire, Argentina, and Peru began renegotiating their debt; in 1979, they were
joined by Gabon, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Togo, Turkey, and Jamaica. Id. at 44.
13. Half of precrisis commercial lending to developing countries arose in the last three
years before the onset of the debt crises in 1982. Id.
14. Feinberg, supra note 6, at 6 (quoting unnamed banker).
15. In 1980-81, $38 billion in long-term capital flowed into the region annually, while the
cumulative total for the next four years was only $20 billion. Annual levels of capital inflows
declined even further in the late 1980s. Massive increases in capital flight exacerbated the
problem. Bank for International Settlements, supra note 9, at 18.
16. WORLD DEBT TABLES, supra note 2, at 46.
17. Id.
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heavily indebted countries (HICs).18 Ill-advised domestic economic
policies often exacerbated the problems brought on by the debt crisis.1 9
Unstable economic conditions induced many local nationals to take their
money abroad, and levels of capital flight reached perhaps two-thirds of
external debt stock by 19 90 .20 Disgruntled debtor country citizens
demanded a reduction or an end to debt servicing, but their governments
feared the consequences of default.
B. Dealing with the Debt Crisis
The possibility of widespread defaults on developing country loans
threatened the international banking system itself. Exposed lenders soon
sought official help in dealing with the debt crisis.' Initial attempts to
resolve the debt crisis involved granting debtor countries short-term
liquidity relief by refinancing interest payments as they came due. This
limited relief proved inadequate, however, and more substantial debt-relief
mechanisms evolved.
The Baker Plan was the first major debt-relief initiative. Launched in
1985, the Baker Plan sought to stimulate new bank lending to developing
countries by promoting macroeconomic policy changes such as trade
liberalization, privatization, and increased foreign investment. 2 Although
the Baker Plan met with limited success, it failed to reduce significantly
outstanding debt or to attract new commercial bank lending.
Debtor countries' inability to attract new loans led to the introduction
of various market-based debt relief programs, including debt buy-backs,23
debt-for-debt swaps,24 and debt-equity swaps. In 1987-1988, a menu
18. Lack of foreign capital forced many HICs to slash imports and public spending. For
instance, middle-income HICs saw import volumes drop by 15% and investment rates by 20%
between 1982 and 1985. Id. In seventeen middle-income HIC's between 1980 and 1987,
investment and imports fell more than five percent per year, while per capita consumption fell
almost two percent a year. THE WORLD BANK/ INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION
AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1988, at 30 (1988) [hereinafter, WORLD
BANK REPORT 1988]. Declining consumption levels had an immediate economic impact on the
living standards of local nationals, while the lack of investment reduced prospects for future
growth.
19. In addition, many developing countries were forced to assume local private sector
debts to appease international creditors or to relieve financially-strapped domestic private firins,
thus adding to fiscal pressures. WORLD DEBT TABLES, supra note 2, at 47.
20. Id. at 49. Between 1976 and 1984, estimates put capital flight from Latin America at
levels roughly equal to its increase in external debt. Survey: Third World Finance, supra note
9, at 8.
21. WORLD DEBT TABLES, supra note 2, at 49-51.
22. Id. at 51; A Glossary of Debt Terms, WORLD BANK INFO. BRIEFS (The World Bank,
Wash., D.C.), #C.03.8-92; The Brady Initiative, supra note 9.
23. A debtor country buying back its own debt at a discount.
24. Banks swap debt instruments denominated in foreign currencies for local currency
obligations.
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approach to debt reduction emerged, as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico
allowed individual commercial banks to choose debt reduction instru-
ments that suited their preferences.25
These measures also failed to resolve the debt issue, and in 1989,
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Brady proposed a more comprehensive
solution that combined new roles for multilateral financial institutions
with new money flows and outright debt relief.26 The Brady Plan provid-
ed both debt reduction and liquidity relief to eligible debtor countries.27
The Plan's two premises were that voluntary commercial bank lending
would not resume until debt had been reduced to manageable levels, but,
at the same time, that debt could not be reduced without new money
flows. Under the Brady Plan, multilateral financial institutions provided
necessary new financing for debtor countries and facilitated restructuring
negotiations that allowed debtor countries to retire debt at a discount by
offering commercial bank creditors a menu of market-based debt reduc-
tion schemes, including the conversion of foreign debt into debtor country
government bonds or equity in local companies.2 The Brady Plan thus
created pools of liquid, homogeneous debt instruments which allowed
bankers to disregard traditional country risk concerns. One banker
explained that "[p]re-Brady debt still trades on a discounted basis ...
Post-Brady trades on yield."'29 The Brady Plan has been successful to a
certain degree because it recognized that the outstanding debt was not
worth its face value, provided cash flow relief to debtor countries and
security to creditor banks, and encouraged debtor countries to improve
investment regimes to attract foreign and flight capital?0
By the end of 1992, Costa Rica, Mexico, the Philippines, Uruguay,
Venezuela, and Nigeria had negotiated Brady Plan debt reductions. When
tentative agreements with Argentina and Brazil are finalized, the Brady
Plan will have succeeded in restructuring about half of all outstanding
25. WORLD DEBT TABLES, supra note 2, at 52.
26. Kdnz, supra note 2, at 535. Brady Plan programs often involve the forgiveness of
between 25% and 50% of debt. Francesca Carnevale, Banking on a Future in Debt, TRADE
FIN., Feb. 1992, at 28, 31.
27. To qualify for participation in the Brady Plan, a debtor country needed a major
problem with debt overhang, a program of progressive economic reforms, and prospects for
strong economic growth. The Brady Initiative, supra note 9.
28. The menu approach is desirable because different tax and regulatory regimes in
creditor bank countries require different approaches to writing off bad debt. Menu options
typically include new money bonds, par and discount bonds, debt buy-backs, temporary interest
rate reduction bonds, debt-equity conversion privileges, recapture clauses based on commodity
prices or GDP, and bonds with phased enhancements. WORLD DEBT TABLES, supra note 2, at
52.
29. Carnevale, supra note 26, at 30.
30. David C. Mulford, The Americas: Moving Beyond the Latin Debt Crisis, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 21, 1992, at A7.
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developing country commercial bank debt.3' The introduction of various
debt reduction policies has allowed debtor countries to reduce their
exposure by more than $60 billion from 1986 through 1991, as compared
to $1 billion in 1984 through 1985.32
While the Brady Plan proved quite successful in dealing with the
problems of those countries indebted to commercial banks, many low-
income HICs never had access to commercial lenders and owed debt
primarily to official creditors.33 Official lending to these countries on
concessional terms continued unabated until the late 1980s, when their
faltering command economies and plunging export receipts forced many
of them into arrears. Relief attempts have taken the form of new financ-
ing, debt forgiveness, and debt rescheduling. Since 1989, when debt
levels were recognized as unsustainable, $10.9 billion in official develop-
ment assistance debt to low-income HICs has been cancelled.' Most
negotiations with official creditors have been conducted under the
auspices of the so-called Paris Club.
The Paris Club is the name given to ad hoc meetings of creditor
governments that arrange for the renegotiation of debt owed to or guar-
anteed by official creditors.35 Although neither the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) nor the International
Monetary Fund (LMF) belong to the Paris Club, the IMF plays an
important role in debt rescheduling negotiations because neither official
creditors nor commercial banks will reschedule debt unless the debtor
country has instituted an IMF-approved economic stabilization program.36
Established in 1956, the Paris Club was not very active until the late-
1970s, when oil-importing countries requested rescheduling. Originally,
Paris Club reschedulings were intended as a means of allowing debtor
countries to avoid "imminent default"37 by providing short-term liquidity
relief for long-term debt. The onset of the debt crisis in 1982 required a
new approach, however, and the Paris Club responded with new terms3
31. WORLD DEBT TABLES, supra note 2, at 55. By the end of 1992, only Columbia and
Peru had not rescheduled their foreign debt. Bank for International Settlements, supra note 9,
at 23.
32. Bank for International Settlements, supra note 9, at 23.
33. See WORLD DEBT TABLES, supra note 2, at 56.
34. Id. at 57.
35. The Paris Club has no charter, bylaws, or permanent membership, and relies heavily
on precedent and consensus during debt negotiations. Id. at 73.
36. A Glossary of Debt Terms, supra note 22, at 1.
37. WORLD DEBT TABLES, supra note 2, at 57.
38. See id. at 57. The Paris Club introduced the Toronto terms in 1988. Originally
intended only for a few low-income African nations, the Toronto terms had been granted to 20
developing countries by September 30, 1991. The Houston terms followed in September 1990,
with enhanced Toronto terms established in December 1991. See id. at 76-79.
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that have resulted in major changes to Paris Club agreements.39 In early
1991, the Paris Club designated Poland and Egypt as "exceptional cases"
and rescheduled all of their foreign debt on highly concessional terms that
amounted to a fifty percent reduction in the real value of the debt.'
The Paris Club now also includes provisions allowing for various
debt swaps, including debt-equity swaps.4' These provisions are voluntary
in that they are to be accepted and elaborated upon in bilateral agree-
ments. There is no cap on the amount of intergovernmental or official
development assistance (ODA) loans that can be converted via swaps, but
the Paris Club imposed a swap ceiling of ten percent on each creditor
country's outstanding non-ODA debt to preserve equal treatment of
creditors.42
In 1990, the United States announced a unilateral approach to reduc-
ing debt owed to the U.S. government by Latin American and Caribbean
countries. The "Enterprise for the Americas Initiative" (EAI)43 was meant
to promote economic growth by encouraging trade, investment, and debt
reduction in Latin American and Caribbean countries which had imple-
mented economic stabilization programs and restructured their commercial
debt.44 The EAI allowed the U.S. president to forgive portions of certain
official debt in return for new obligations from the debtor country to
repay the remaining principal in dollars and to pay interest in local
currency into a fund established to support conservation and development
projects in the debtor country.45 The president was also authorized to sell
or cancel debt to facilitate debt-for-nature or debt-for-equity exchanges.'
Attempts to resolve the debt crisis have not been limited to debt
restructuring and rescheduling initiatives; extensive efforts have also been
made to increase the debtor countries' ability to pay by promoting sound
economic policies. Before providing new loans or agreeing to reschedule,
commercial banks and official creditors generally require developing
countries to comply with IMF-mandated austerity programs. In many
debtor countries, problems imposed by high debt service payments were
exacerbated by large budget deficits, foreign exchange and trade controls,
39. For example, extended (20 to 25 year) maturities, flexible amortization schedules, and
outright debt forgiveness are now allowed in some circumstances. Id. at 77-78.
40. Id. at 77.
41. Id. at 79.
42. Id.
43. 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 2430-2430h (West Supp. 1993)
44. See J. Eugene Gibson & William J. Schrenk, The Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative: A Second Generation of Debt-for-Nature Exchanges, 25 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
EcoN. 1, 16 (1992).
45. See id. at 17.
46. Id. at 17-18; 7 U.S.C. § 1738p (Supp. IV. 1992).
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price controls on basic commodities, and government-directed investment
or subsidies into unproductive sectors of the economy. Deficit-fuelled
inflation47 and pervasive government intervention in the economy place
artificial constraints on economic growth. The IMF's solution is to slash
government spending and intervention in the economy to spur greater
efficiency by reliance on the free market.
The IMF austerity measures often have short-term deleterious effects
on debtor country living standards, and are often the subject of bitter
complaints by citizens of the debtor country. The World Bank notes that
"[l]ower living standards are unavoidable when the previous level has
been artificially raised by unsustainable policies."" Critics, however,
charge that some aspects of the austerity programs prolong economic
recession instead of promoting growth.49
Recently, renewed investment flows and access to international capital
markets since 1989 have led some to declare the end of the debt crisis.'
The controversial economic reforms instituted since the mid 1980s have
in fact produced encouraging signs of economic growth." Smaller debt
service payments have made available additional resources for productive
investment, and new financial resources have enabled debtor countries to
reduce inflation by slashing deficit spending.
Latin American debtor countries are farthest along the road to
recovery. Most new financing in Latin America is in the form of bond
and equity flows. Blue-chip Latin American companies are issuing bonds
on international capital markets and stock markets in the region are
47. Inflation in middle-income HICs was six times higher in 1982-91 than in 1973-81,
and twice as high as the average for other developing countries. World Debt Tables, supra note
2, at 47-49.
48. WORLD BANK REPORT 1988, supra note 18, at 60.
49. Neva Seidman Makgetla, External Influences on Third World Debt, 12 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 591, 610-11 (1989).
50. In 1991, the total flow of long-term capital to the developing world was $205 billion,
compared with $157 billion in 1981. Of the 1991 total, only 17% represented commercial bank
lending, which accounted for about half of predebt crisis capital flows. Bonds, equities, and
foreign direct investment accounted for 25% of capital inflows in 1991, compared to less then
10% in 1981. Bonds and equity flows increased from $20 billion in 1991 to $35 billion in
1992. From Bank to Market: Capital Flows to the Third World, ECONOMIST, Apr. 24, 1993,
at 86.
51. The debt-to-exports ratio of middle-income countries has declined to pre-1981 levels.
Inflation has fallen by two-thirds, and investment in the region reached $40 billion in 1991, an
eight-fold increase over 1989. Mulford, supra note 30, at A7; Nonguaranteed commercial bank
debt to developing countries peaked in 1982 at $89 billion, but fell to $26.4 billion by 1986
as banks sought to exit the market and reschedulings "nationalized" large portions of
developing country debt. UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, DEBT
EQUITY CONVERSIONS - A GUIDE FOR DECISION-MAKERS 8 (1990) [hereinafter U.N. GUIDE].
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booming.5 2 A good project in Mexico, Chile, or Venezuela can now be
financed, unlike a few years ago.53
There are three major differences between the developing countries'
precrisis external financing and recent financing patterns. First, only
certain developing countries have regained access to international
financial markets. Second, bank loans now constitute a smaller share of
external financing; and third, more of the capital is directed to the private
sector rather than governments or state-owned enterprises.m
Only those developing countries that have successfully tackled their
debt servicing problems, and introduced economic reforms that promote
economic stability and the private sector, have been successful in attract-
ing new capital flows; the poorest countries have not yet regained access
to international capital.
The composition of the capital flows has also changed, with foreign
direct investment (FDI) and equity supplanting bank loans. In the past,
developing countries often discouraged foreign direct investment because
it was accompanied by the direct participation of foreign management.
Now it is often encouraged for the same reason. Although worldwide FDI
has declined in the past two years, it has actually increased in the
developing world.55
Investment in bonds, equities, and other securities has increased even
faster, growing from less than $10 billion in 1989 to $37 billion in 1992.
Portfolio investment has been a convenient vehicle for the return of flight
capital. In addition, international finance is being channeled in greater
amounts to the private sector, which can make more efficient use of the
capital.56
Despite these encouraging signs, it is still premature to say that the
debt crisis is over. Many developing countries still face considerable
difficulties in servicing their debt and attracting new capital.5 7 Moreover,
52. The Buenos Aries stock market rose fourteen-fold in the first three weeks of August
1991, before dropping by one-half over a weekend. Thomas Kamm, Latin America Escapes the
Jaws of Debt; Region's Return to the Market Draws Flood of Foreign Capital, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 29, 1991, at A7. Foreign investment into Mexican stocks grew from $4.2 billion in 1991
to $27 billion in 1992. Anthony DePalma, Fortunes are Cast in Mexican Stocks, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 12, 1993, at DI, D4. Between 1989 and 1992 gross flows of equity finance to Latin
America expanded by more than tenfold, from $434 million to $5.6 billion. From Bank to
Market, supra note 50, at 86.
53. Kamm, supra note 52, at A7.
54. Survey: Third World Finance, supra note 9, at 15.
55. Between 1989 and 1992, global FDI fell from $234 billion to $150 billion; in the same
period, FDI in developing countries grew from $29 billion to $40 billion. In 1991, Mexico,
China, Malaysia, Argentina, and Thailand accounted for about one-half of the total. In 1991,
Malaysia received enough FDI to finance almost one-fifth of all domestic investment. Id. at 16.
56. Id. at 20.
57. By the end of 1991, the United Nations estimated service arrears for Latin America
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a new debt crisis looms over Eastern Europe, where unstable political and
economic conditions vastly complicate attempts to promote debt relief
and foreign investment.
C. Emergence of the Secondary Debt Market
During the debt crisis, the inability of many developing countries to
service their loans induced many creditors to remove the bad debt from
their books by selling their public and private sector debt at a discount
determined by the perceived risk of nonpayment under the terms of the
loan. A secondary debt market soon emerged to facilitate the increasing
volume of debt transactions.58
The first transactions involved debt swaps at face value among banks
that wished to align their debt portfolios with their risk assessments or
regional expertise. 59 As the debt crisis continued, many regional banks
decided to stop lending to developing countries altogether and to use the
secondary market to dispose of the developing country debt that remained
on their books.
As the debt crisis continued, four factors contributed to the develop-
ment of a secondary market: (1) the growing willingness of banks to sell
or swap their debt despite significant discounts; (2) the consolidation of
debtor countries' debt into more homogeneous debt instruments; (3) a
simplification of debt transfer procedures and the resultant decline in
transaction costs; and (4) the introduction of debt conversion schemes in
various countries.6°
Major international banks are the principal debt brokers in secondary
market transactions. These banks have retained most of their debt, but
earn lucrative commissions by arranging secondary market transactions
for third parties. Most debt is still supplied by the regional banks, which
have largely chosen to clear out their developing country portfolios. Debt
transactions have taken many forms, 6' but since the emergence of debt-
equity swap programs in 1986, most of the demand comes from investors
and the Caribbean at $25 billion. BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, THE DEBT-EQUITY
SWAP HANDBOOK, Debt-Equity Swap Update (Nov. 1991), at 1 (1992)[hereinafter SWAP
GUIDE]. Total foreign debt to that area was $432 billion at end of 1990, expected to rise three
percent with interest and new financing. Id.
58. The secondary market has no central exchange or regulation, and is composed
primarily of a loose network of debt brokers.
59. E.g., European banks trading Latin American debt for the East European debt of a U.S.
commercial bank. WORLD DEBT TABLES, supra note 2, at 109.
60. U.N. GUIDE, supra note 51, at 18.
61. Debt-equity swaps and debt capitalizations, debt securitization, debt buyback, debt-for-
goods swaps, debt-for-nature swaps, and other informal conversion instruments. WORLD DEBT
TABLES, supra note 2, at 109.
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such as multinational corporations, banks, and investment funds, as well
as developing countries purchasing their own debt at a discount.
Prices for debt on the secondary debt market vary widely according
to the debtor country involved and the banks' perception of how likely
they are to be repaid.62 Although a myriad of factors determine the
secondary market price of a country's debt, the three chief factors are the
debt-servicing status of the debtor country, the success of a country's
debt-equity swap program, and the level of creditor banks' loss
provisioning reserves. 63 Each country's debt usually consists of several
different types of instruments, with different maturities, coupons, inden-
tures, and rescheduling terms. "Stripped prices" must be utilized to
convert the value of dissimilar debt instruments into a standardized debt
instrument that can be compared to debt in other countries or with
different characteristics."
The secondary market is very thin and rich in arbitrage possibilities. 65
Actual transaction prices often differ markedly from quoted prices,
particularly for debt in low demand. The long-term trend for secondary
market prices for developing country debt has been downward, 66 with the
increased demand for developing country debt offset by the banks'
greater willingness to offload their nonperforming developing country
debt.
The sliding secondary market price of debt has been accompanied by
62. Representative prices are listed below as fractions of face value.
Country April 1988 April 1989 April 1990
Argentina 29% 17-19% 12-13%
Brazil 51.5% 38-39% 24-25%
Chile 59% 57-59% 66-67%
Mexico 52% 42-43% 41-42%
Peru 8% 4-7% 5-7%
U.N. GUIDE, supra note 51, at 21; SWAP GUIDE, supra note 57, Debt-Equity Swap Update
(Mar. 1992), at 3.
63. SWAP GUIDE, supra note 57, Overview at 6.
64. See WORLD DEBT TABLES, supra note 2, at 111.
65. Prices can rise by as much as one percentage point on the basis of a single swap as
small as $50-80 million. SWAP GUIDE, supra note 57, Overview at 5.
66. The accumulated value of developing country debt dropped from 66.7% of face value
in January 1987, to 47.3% of face value in January 1988, to 37.6% of face value in April 1989.
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a huge surge in volume, which increased from only $4 billion in 1985 to
approximately $100 billion in 1991.67
D. The Origins of the Debt-Equity Swap
This rapid growth in secondary market transaction volumes was both
a cause and effect of the adoption of debt-equity swap programs in
various debtor countries. Debt-equity swaps increased the demand for
secondary market debt by bringing multinational corporations to the
secondary markets; meanwhile, a viable secondary market was necessary
to fully develop debt-equity swap programs because it made it feasible to
assemble packages of the requisite debt and eased tax and accounting
concerns by allowing proper valuation of debt."
With a secondary market in place to facilitate debt transactions, debt-
equity swaps became an increasingly attractive debt reduction mechanism,
as they secured benefits for debtor countries, creditor banks, and interna-
tional investors.69 Debtor countries were able to reduce sovereign debt
while stimulating investment flows that had been shut off by a lack of
access to international financing. In debtor countries with privatization
programs, debt-equity swaps could boost private sector interest in state-
owned enterprises. The creditor banks could sell nonperforming debt for
cash, albeit at a steep discount, and some banks stood to earn lucrative
commissions for arranging swap transactions. Finally, by buying debt at
a steep discount on the secondary market and redeeming it at face value
in local currency, investors could realize substantial savings in financing
investments in debtor countries.
1) The Players
In most debt-equity swap programs, there are five key participants:
(1) debtor country authorities; (2) creditor banks; (3) foreign investors;
(4) financial intermediaries (debt brokers); and (5) multilateral organiza-
tions.70
Generally, debt-equity swap programs are devised by the debtor
country's Ministry of Finance or Economy, and are administered through
these ministries and the Central Bank, usually with the involvement of
several other federal and state level ministries. To facilitate their debt-
equity swap program, the Philippines established a special agency with
67. WORLD DEBT TABLES, supra note 2, at 110. Other sources estimate volume as
increasing from $10 billion in 1987 to $200 billion in 1991. Mulford, supra note 30, at A7.
68. U.N. GUIDE, supra note 51, at 19-20.
69. See id. at 8.
70. Id at 22-29.
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representatives of all the ministries necessary to approve a proposed
investment.7 Different countries establish different levels of regulatory
supervision of their programs, although most programs grant debtor
country officials some degree of "veto" power over unacceptable invest-
ment applications. Debtor country officials typically fine-tune their swap
programs frequently, either in response to monetary pressures or in an
effort to channel investment into priority sectors or regions. In many
debtor countries, the debt-equity swap program is closely associated with
one or two senior officials and would be vulnerable were they removed.
The major international commercial banks are also major players in
debt-equity transactions. The syndication of developing country debt
resulted in debtor countries having dozens, or even hundreds, of creditors,
many with different strategic goals.72 Banks seek to align their debt
portfolios according to their risks preferences or corporate objectives:
Some banks want developing country debt off of their books regardless
of the loss; others want to diversify their risks by holding debt of several
different developing countries; yet others seek to consolidate their
portfolios by converting all of their debt into that of the developing
country that they consider most promising.
Regional banks have generally been most eager to sell their develop-
ing country debt on the secondary market so that they can recover some
of their losses on nonperforming loans.73 The international commercial
banks generally held on to their developing country debt, but have started
conducting debt-equity swaps on their own account now that they have
amassed adequate loan-loss reserves.74 Leading international banks such
as Citicorp, Manufacturers Hanover, Chase Manhattan, J.P. Morgan, and
Bankers Trust control steadily increasing percentages of developing
country debt as smaller banks move out of the market.
75
The debt provided to the secondary market by the regional banks is
purchased by various forms of foreign investors. Multinational corporations
account for as much as ninety percent of debt-equity swap volume.76
Multinational corporations like debt-equity swaps because it is often difficult
for them to raise funds in local markets, and because the secondary market
discount can save them betwen twenty-five percent and fifty-five percent
71. See Andrew Hilton, Debt-equity Swaps, C.T.C. REP., Autumn 1990, at 9.
72. Mexico is reported to have had at least 50 creditor banks in 1982; Brazil had 450.
U.N. GUIDE, supra note 51, at 23.
73. Id. at 44.
74. SwAP GUIDE, supra note 57, Overview at 2.
75. U.N. GUIDE., supra note 51, at 25.
76. See SWAP GUIDE, supra note 57, Overview at 2.
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of the cost of the investment.77 Multinational corporations use debt-equity
swaps to finance joint ventures and new projects or to expand existing
operations. Privatization projects and investment into the tourism and
automobile sectors have been popular swap targets. 71 Smaller first-time
foreign investors have been increasing their participation as debt-equity
swaps become more routine and the transaction costs fall. Investment funds
have been a popular means of using debt-equity swaps to channel foreign
equity investment into developing country capital markets.
Creditor banks participate in debt-equity swaps to a lesser extent than
large corporations.79 While most banks are wary of risky equity stakes in
local enterprises, they have been more willing to use debt-equity swaps
to increase their presence in the financial sector of debtor countries.80
Although many of the leading commercial banks noted above have
held on to most of their own debt, they have established debt trading teams
to serve as "debt brokers" to handle debt-equity transactions on their own
account and especially for third-party clients.8 ' International investment
banks and small specialist firms have also emerged as financial intermedi-
aries despite the lack of developing country debt on their own books. The
debt trading teams of U.S. banks have played the largest role as debt
brokers, but European banks also play a major role.8 2 Some debt-equity
swap programs mandate the participation of local financial intermediaries
in debt-equity transactions; regardless of formal requirements, many debt
brokers have established close relations with local financial institutions
through equity stakes or agreements.
The major function of debt brokers is to go to the secondary market
to assemble the requisite package of debt for the intended investment.
Financial intermediaries also typically perform services such as preparing
the contracts, dealing with debtor country authorities, and submitting the
necessary applications. Debt-equity swaps are very complex and fees by
the financial intermediaries impose high transaction costs.
77. See id.
78. U.N. GUIDE, supra note 51, at 27.
79. SWAP GUIDE, supra note 57, Overview at 2.
80. U.N. GUIDE, supra note 51, at 27.
81. U.S. banking regulations create distinctions between banks trading their own debt and
handling debt transactions for third-party clients. Banks fear participating in swaps on their own
account because it could "contaminate" the remainder of their debt portfolio by forcing banks
to mark the rest of the debt on their books down to the fair market value as determined in the
transaction.
82. The Dutch bank Nederlandische Middenstandbank was probably the largest debt swapper
in Latin America in the late-1980s. U.N. GUIDE, supra note 51, at 27.
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Debt brokers are chosen largely on the basis of price, 3 although their
banking relationship with the investor also plays a large role in the selection;
debt-equity swaps are often conducted on the basis of "a phone call, a
handshake and an understanding."" Financial intermediaries generally either
charge a fixed fee for the debt with no additional charges, or require a
percentage spread of the face value of the debt purchased. The fixed price
option is more popular with investors because it allows more certainty in
predicting costs. In adition to payments to debt brokers, fees must often
be paid to central banks and agent banks.8 5
Multilateral organizations are involved in debt-equity programs as
analysts, advisors, and active investors. Organizations such as the IMF are
interested primarily in analyzing the macroeconomic impact of debt-equity
swaps on developing countries, while the World Bank has funded studies
of swap programs and provided technical assistance for administering the
programs. The International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector
arm of the World Bank, has been an active participant in conventional swap
transactions and has been especially active in setting up debt-equity swap
investment funds, where the local currency obtained in the swaps is invested
in local stock markets.8 6 Most multinational organizations support the
inclusion of debt-equity swaps on a "menu" of debt restructuring options.
The full-scale development of the secondary debt market and the
endorsement of debt-equity swaps by multilateral institutions have been
critical in the development of the debt-equity swap. Informal intracompany
debt-equity swaps 7 are not new, but only well-conceived official programs
can bring about meaningful debt reduction while attracting significant
amounts of foreign capital.
2) Origins of the Debt-Equity Swap
The idea of using a formal program to convert sovereign debt into
private sector equity may have first arisen during negotiations restructuring
Turkish debt in the mid 1970s, but Brazil was the first country to implement
a program on a useful scale in the late 1970s. Nonetheless, interest in debt-
83. Competition has forced margins down from four to five percent to less than two percent.
SWAP GUIDE, supra note 57, Overview at 5.
84. 1d. at 4.
85. U.N. GUIDE, supra note 51, at 29-30.
86. The IFC promoted a $65 million First Philippine Capital Fund and a smaller Chilean
fund. Id. at 28.
87. An intracompany debt swap is a transaction in which a company forgives a foreign
subsidiary's intracompany debt in return for a greater equity stake in the subsidiary.
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equity swaps remained low until Chile introduced its effective debt-equity
swap program in 1986.
The success of the Chilean program sparked further interest in debt-
equity swaps, and other debtor countries launched programs. Mexico, the
Philippines, Ecuador, Jamaica, Venezuela, and Nigeria initiated programs,
while Argentina and Brazil revamped their procedures. 8 The individual
programs of Chile, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico will be analyzed in Part
in.
Although it is difficult to quantify debt-equity transactions because
of the variety of formal and informal programs, estimates are that major
debtor countries converted about $15 billion between 1985 and 1989,
representing about three percent of their total commercial debt.89 The volume
of debt-equity transactions is cyclical and depends to a large extent on the
movement of international interest rates, the state of the world economy,
and the status of debtor countries in Brady Plan or debt restructuring
negotiations.
II. INSIDE THE DEBT-EQUITY SWAP
Champions of debt-equity swaps regard them as almost magical in their
ability to transform bad debt into economic growth (and fat fees). Debt-
equity swaps truly benefit everyone. Businesses obtain discounted financing.
Banks get rid of nonperforming debt.90 Debtor countries reduce debt while
attracting foreign investment.91
Debt-equity swaps have many detractors, however, especially in debtor
countries. Although many criticize debt-equity swaps for their macroeco-
nomic impact on debtor countries, the most potent attacks come from those
who condemn the swaps as a form of neocolonialism where multinational
banks and corporations assume control over developing country economies.
The truth lies somewhere in the middle. Before devising a swap
program, a policymaker needs a firm grasp of the economic and political
realities in the particular debtor country and must understand its goals and
priorities for economic development. Only this knowledge will allow the
88. U.N. GUIDE, supra note 51, at 11-12.
89. Id. at 12. There are alternate estimates on the volume of debt-equity transactions. One
set of figures estimates debt-equity swaps at $497 million in 1985, rising to almost $9.5 billion
in 1990 before dropping to less than $2 billion in 1991. WORLD DEBT TABLES, supra note 2,
at 110. Another set of world-wide debt-equity swap figures shows $773 million in swaps in 1984,
increasing to $8.8 billion by 1988. STUN CLAESSENS ET AL., POLICY, RESEARCH, AND EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS, THE WORLD BANK, No. 16, MARKET-BASED DEBT REDUCTION FOR DEVELOPING
COUNrmEs 51 (1990); U.N. GUIDE, supra note 51, at 13.
90. U.N. GUIDE, supra note 51, at 44.
91. Id. at 35-39.
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provisions of the swap program to be carefully tailored to achieve the
country's plan for economic development.
A. The Mechanics of a Debt-Equity Swap
A typical debt-equity swap seems simple, but debt-equity swaps are
actually extremely complex arrangements with very high transaction
costs. There are three general types of debt-equity swaps: 92 (1) swaps
in which a private entity's debt is traded for an equity stake in that
enterprise; (2) swaps in which sovereign debt is traded for equity in a
private sector enterprise; and (3) swaps in which sovereign debt is converted
into equity in a public enterprise undergoing privatization.
The simplest form of debt-equity swap is the intracompany version
whereby a company forgives the internal debt of a foreign subsidiary in
return for a greater equity stake. In these transactions, no debt package
has to be assembled and restrictive legal documentation can be kept to a
minimum as the parent investor controls the subsidiary.
In a more common form of debt-equity swap, a company seeks to swap
a portion of the debtor country's sovereign or private external debt for an
equity stake in a private company. The company would hire a debt broker
to assemble a package of the country's debt large enough to finance its
investment project. These hard-currency debts are then redeemed for local
currency or local currency denominated bonds issued by the debtor country's
central bank. Central banks often redeem this debt at about eighty percent
of face value, leaving the twenty percent redemption discount as an added
benefit for the debtor country government.93 The bonds or local currency
are then used to finance a preapproved investment project in the debtor
country.
Such a transaction does not seem complicated, but beneath the surface
lies a series of intricate problems. The difficulties begin when a debtor
country issues new decrees or legislation authorizing a debt-equity swap
program (the regulations). These regulations are generally very complex
because the debtor country must choose between several conflicting goals,
92. Derek Asiedu-Akrofi, A Comparative Analysis of Debt-Equity Swap Programs in Five
Major Debtor Countries, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 537, 540 (1989).
93.
Secondary market Incentive Redemption price Debtor Fact
price of debt to investor granted to inves- government value of
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typically seeking to reduce debt, to attract foreign investors, and to promote
economic development.
Investors are well-advised to speak with responsible host country
officials and good lawyers very early in the process of initiating an
investment through a debt-equity swap. The investor must first determine
whether the project fits within the scope of a country's swap program.
Projects that promote exports, create jobs, or bring in high technology are
particularly likely to be acceptable to the debtor country. Next, the investor
must submit a project application that typically requires information about
the investor's other business projects in the debtor country, the specific
debt to be swapped and through whom, the exact use of the swap funds,
and the proposed project schedule. Final approval is attained through an
auction for swap rights or a review of each proposal by debtor country
officials. 94 To promote serious investment activity, debtor countries often
impose restrictions on repatriation of capital and remittance of dividends.
Some also limit the percentage of the project that may be financed via debt-
equity swap and require new money for the remainder.
Assembling debt packages is another tricky aspect of debt-equity swaps.
The debt broker retained by the investor acquires the requisite amount of
debt through a complex series of transactions. Debt often changes hands
several times before being secured by the investor. If the project requires
a stream of investment rather than one lump sum, investors will often
purchase and swap the debt in stages as a hedge against depreciation of
swapped local currency or to avoid driving up the price of the debt to
prohibitive levels. Cumulative brokers' margins reduce the debt's discount
on the secondary market.95
94. SwAP GUIDE, supra note 57, Overview at 3.
95. A typical debt-equity swap transaction would proceed as follows:
1) Corporation A instructs Bank B to assemble $30 million (face value) worth of
eligible debt of Country C to finance in investment in Country C through C's debt-
equity conversion program. Bank B charges 2% of the market value of the debt.
2) Bank B assembles the debt at the average price of 45% of face value for a total
of $13.5 million. Bank B earns $270,000 in fees for the transaction.
3) If Country C allocated debt-equity conversion rights via auctions, Bank B would
take Corporation A's debt to the program auction to bid for the right to convert the
debt. A typical auction would require Bank B to bid up to 25% of the value of the
debt, meaning that Corporation A is willing to give up 25% of the face value as a
"discount" to the debtor government. Corporation A will thus receive $22.5 million
in local currency, rather than the $30 million face value. Fees to the agent bank and
local broker could total another $630,000 for such a transaction, while the central bank
might take off another 5% discount fee, reducing the local currency received to perhaps
$21 million. For its $13.5 million initial investment augmented by almost $1 million
in fees, Corporation A thus receives $21 million in local currency.
See U.N. GUIDE, supra note 51, at 29-30.
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Once the debt is assembled by the broker its title must be transferred
to the investor. The timing of the transfer is crucial, and investors seek
to purchase the debt as late as possible to minimize "walk-away" costs
if the deal should fall through. Debt purchase contracts usually provide
that the investor will be relieved of the commitment to buy the debt if the
project does not go ahead.
Contractual provisions in the syndicated loan agreements are a major
obstacle to the establishment of a formal debt-equity swap program.96 In
particular, the debtor country might need waivers of mandatory prepayment
and "sharing" clauses that are intended to prevent the preferential treatment
of one creditor at the expense of the others. Recently, loan documents have
been drafted to avoid these difficulties by stipulating that these clauses are
only activated if prepayment is made in a foreign currency.' Restrictions
on permissible assignees may preclude assignment of the debt to anyone
but banks or other financial institutions, because debtor countries initially
sought to keep their debt in the hands of banks that might be more easily
persuaded to provide "new" money. 9 One alternative is to provide a blanket
authorization for assignment to nonfinancial institutions when the assignment
is part of a debt-equity swap.99 Legal opinions are necessary to determine
the impact of these clauses.
B. Other Debt Conversion Schemes
Enthusiasm for the potential of the basic debt-equity swap has been
tempered by recognition of its limitations. Numerous debt conversion
schemes have adapted the basic debt swap framework to achieve other
ends. ioo
Two economists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology have
developed a debt conversion program to cover interest payments.10 1
Following the conclusion of a restructuring agreement, the Modigliani-
Dornbusch approach provides that creditors wil accept all interest payments
in the form of local currency paid into special accounts. 1 2 The creditor




100. See id. at 14-17.
101. See Franco Modigliani & Rudiger Dornbusch, Easing the Mexican Interest Burden,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 1989, at A12.
102. Another variation more acceptable to banks would be to require hard currency for that
portion of interest payments representing London Interbank minus the current rate of interest,
with the remainder paid into the local currency accounts. Victor L. Urquidi, A Proposal to Create
a System for Part-payment in Local Currency of Interest on External Debt, in JoNrr EcoN. COMM.,
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then has the right to invest these funds into local firms and to receive local-
currency denominated dividends, which will be eligible for conversion into
foreign currency after a certain period."' A variation would be for these
local currency payments to be pooled into investment funds administered
by multinational organizations such as the IFC for investment in export
sectors.°" One attractive feature of this approach is that it can be implement-
ed on a stand-alone basis or in conjunction with more comprehensive Brady
Plan or debt-equity swap programs. Such a program could also be structured
to facilitate the development of the debtor country's financial sector.
Another debt conversion program provides that creditors accept
repayment for interest or principal in the form of in-kind exports which
the creditor then sells abroad. The chief obstacle to these "debt-for-trade"
schemes lies in the pari passu and sharing clauses in syndicated loan
agreements. Such a program has been introduced only in Peru, where First
Interstate Bank orchestrated an agreement between a consortium of Peru's
twenty main creditors. Most transactions accomplished to date have involved
short-term, unsyndicated debt.'0 5
Debt-for-nature programs have played a small role in reducing debt
but have potential to make a significant impact'on preserving the natural
resources of debtor countries.'16 The simplest form of debt-for-nature swaps
involve the cancellation of foreign debt in return for debtor country
governmental commitments to implement specified environmental policies.
Another form of debt-for-nature swap replaces foreign debt with local
cur ency denominated bonds that are used to finance environmental activities
in the debtor country. Typically, an international environmental organization
IOOTH CONG., IST SESS., ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE DEBT PROBLEM:
SELECTED ESSAYS 105, 108 (Joint Comm. Print 1987).
103. One commentator recommends that the real rate of interest be covered by foreign
currency payments, while the remainder is paid in local currency into "restricted" bank accounts
that would earn local currency interest at the inflation rate or would be hedged. Id. at 105-09.
104. U.N. GUIDE, supra note 51, at 14.
105. The program requires banks to pay two dollars for every three dollars worth of export
goods. The discount goes to retire short term debt.
106. See generally, Priya Alagiri, Give Us Sovereignty or Give Us Debt: Debtor Countries'
Perspective on Debt-For-Nature Swaps, 41 AM.U.L.REv. 485 (1992); Gibson & Schrenk, supra
note 44, at 1; Laurie P. Greener, Debt-For-Nature Swaps in Latin American Countries: The
Enforcement Dilemma, 7 CONN. J. INT'L L. 123 (1991); Jean Terranova, Enterprise For The
Americas Initiative Act: A Pragmatic Response to Debt and Environmental Crises, 15 Suffolk
Transnat'l L.J. 153 (1991); Nancy Knupfer, Debt-For-Nature Swaps: Innovation or Intrusion?,
4 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 86 (1991); Rosanne Model, Debt-For-Nature Swaps: Environmental
Investments Using Taxpayer Funds WithoutAdequate Remedies For Expropriation, 15 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 1195 (1991); Nina M. Dillon, The Feasibility of Debt-For-Nature Swaps, 16 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 127 (1991); Allegra G. Biggs, Nibbling Away at the Debt Crisis: Debt-For-
Nature Swaps, 10 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 429 (1991); Molly J. Moline, Debt-For-Nature
Exchanges: Attempting to Deal Simultaneously With Two Global Problems, 22 L. & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 133 (1991).
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buys the debt to be forgiven on the secondary market and donates it to
a local nongovernmental organization that takes part in planning and
executing the environmental plan. Bolivia and Costa Rica completed the
first such swaps in 1987, with Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Madagascar, Mexico, the Philippines, and Zambia all subsequently
introducing programs. 107 These agreements have remained very small scale,
and are criticized as being unenforceable and as representing a new form
of "eco-imperialism."
Debt-for-development programs are similar to debt-for-nature schemes
in many respects. 38 International aid organizations such as United Nations
spend millions of dollars funding aid and development programs in
developing countries. A debt-for-development swap cancels debt bought
for a discount on the secondary market in return for redemption in local
currency at near face value. International aid organizations utilize these
local currency funds to expand their operations in the debtor country while
reducing the country's debt servicing.1°9 Debt-for-development schemes
are limited by the same tax, accounting, and regulatory issues as debt-for-
nature programs.1°
The same mechanism has been used to swap foreign debt for local
currency to be used to provide educational opportunities for students of
debtor and creditor countries. Harvard University and Ecuador instituted
a debt-for-education program in which Harvard cancelled debt purchased
on the secondary market in return for the establishment of a local currency
endowment in Ecuador that funded scholarships for Ecuadorian students
studying at Harvard. Funds were also set aside for fellowships for Harvard
students to study in Ecuador."'
Jacques Attali, President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, has issued a bold proposal to reduce the debt of the former
107. Gibson & Schrenk, supra note 44, at 4-8. In the first debt-for-nature swap, Conservation
International, a U.S. environmental group, bought $650,000 worth of Bolivian debt for $100,000
and converted it into local currency in return for a covenant by the Bolivian government to set
aside four million acres of rain forest as a nature preserve. The more sophisticated Costa Rican
plan redeems debt at 75% of face value in local currency which is deposited into a special
environmental fund in Costa Rica.
Tax, accounting, and regulatory concerns in creditor countries have limited the attractiveness
of donating debt for such swaps. U.N. Guide, supra 51, at 15-16.
108. Eve Burton, Debt-For-Development: A New OpportunityforNon-Profits, Commercial
Banks, and Developing States, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 233 (1990).
109. Midland Bank executed one of the few completed debt-for-development transactions
when it donated Sudanese debt with a face value of $800,000 to the United Nations Children's
Fund, which the Sudanese government converted into local currency for use in development
programs in drought-stricken areas. U.N. GUIDE, supra note 51, at 16.
110. Gibson & Schrenk, supra note 44, at 55-63.
111. Jennifer F. Zaiser, Swapping Debt For Education: Harvard and Ecuador Provide a
Model for Relief 12 BosToN COLL. THIRD WORLD L.J. 157 (1992).
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Soviet Union (FSU) in return for the dismantling of the region's nuclear
warheads. This "debt-for-nukes" proposal has been called "the ultimate
debt-for-nature swap.""'
C. Legal, Tax, Accounting, and Regulatory Considerations
The legal, tax, accounting, and regulatory regimes of creditor countries
play major roles in debt-equity swaps and will be mentioned briefly here. "
The complexity of debt-equity swaps requires careful drafting of the
legal documentation." 4 Legal fees can mount quickly however, and
experienced debt swappers often impose expense caps on their legal teams.
Tax treatment of debt-equity swaps in creditor and debtor countries
will often determine the success or failure of a swap program. Usually tax
treatment in the debtor country is favorable or at least neutral, because one
of the objectives of the program is to attract investment. Creditor country
tax laws thus assume particular importance. One crucial tax issue in debt-
equity swaps is the method of taxing the gain received by the investor (the
difference between the price paid for the debt and the value of the local
currency received)." 5 Other tax issues involve taxation policies for capital
gains and dividends. The different tax regimes in the various creditor
countries account for much of the enthusiasm for debt reduction menus.
Accounting considerations also play a major role in debt-equity swaps.
U.S. accounting rules do not require nonperforming debt to be marked down
on a bank's books unless portions of it are bought or sold." 6 For the bank
112. EBRD Could Play A Pivotal Role in Promoting Debt Relief Via Swaps, EBRD WATCH,
Mar. 23, 1992, at 1.
113. SWAP GUIDE, supra note 57, Key Legal, Tax and Accounting Considerations for Debt-
Equity Swaps, at 1-11 ; Stuart M. Berkson and Bruce A. Cohen, The Tax Implications of Debt-
For-Equity Swaps, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMp. L. REV. 575-90 (1989); Gibson & Schrenk,
supra note 44, at 25; Leslie A. Sowle, International Debt For Equity Swaps: Does Revenue Ruling
87-1224 Make Sense?, 83 N.W. UNIv. L. REV. 1079 (1989); Andrew C. Quale, Jr., New
Approaches to the Management and Disposition by Banks of Their LDC Debt: Legal and
Accounting Considerations, PLI Order No. B4-6827 (Apr. 21, 1988) 596 PLI/Corp 325.
114. The numerous technical drafting issues will not be addressed in detail here. See Swap
Guide, supra note 57, Key Legal, Tax and Accounting Considerations for Debt-Equity Swaps
at 1-3.
115. The Internal Revenue Service issued Revenue Ruling 87-124 in November 1987 to
clarify the tax treatment for debt-equity swaps undertaken by U.S. companies and banks. Ruling
87-124 taxes debt-equity swaps to the extent that the fair market value of the local currency
obtained exceeds the amount the investor pays for the debt. The key, obviously, lies in the
determination of value of the local currency obtained, a task often very difficult due to currency
exchange or repatriation restrictions; it is very important that all factors affecting the value of
a currency, including inflation and general economic conditions, be reflected in the computed
fair market value. Debt swappers criticize 87-124, arguing that the fair market value of the local
currency obtained does not exceed the price paid; the U.S. company does not realize a gain on
the swap and thus should not be taxed. Id. at 4-5.
116. There is little incentive for a bank to buy or sell $100 of Brazilian debt for $50 if the
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disposing of its debt, the transaction is fairly simple: debt is sold for a
discount from the face value which is reflected on the books by a loss on
the transaction. The accounting is trickier for the investor, because the value
must be either the amount paid to buy the debt or the amount of local
currency received for the debt. 117 Market values provided by the secondary
markets provide limited relief to tax lawyers.
U.S. bank regulations, especially the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation
K on International Banking Operations, also impose significant constraints
on debt-equity swaps." 8 Regulation K now allows banks to acquire up to
one-hundred percent of privatizing public sector companies pursuant to
a debt-equity swap program, or up to forty percent of a private sector
enterprise. This is an increase from the maximum twenty percent equity
ownership allowed under the old rules. 19 The modifications to Regulation
K allow banks to swap sovereign debt for private or public sector equity
investments in the debtor countries considered eligible by the Federal
Reserve Board.
D. Evaluating the Effects of a Debt-Equity Swap Program
Although debt-equity swaps offer many benefits to debtor countries,
critics of debt swap programs raise legitimate concerns about the effects
of these programs on the host country. Ultimately, advantages of a debt-
equity swap program outweigh the disadvantages only if the regulations
have been carefully tailored to suit the conditions of the debtor country.
1) Criticisms
Detractors often criticize three potential negative effects of debt-equity
swaps. First, debt-equity swap programs tend to exert inflationary pressure
on the host country economy by expanding its monetary base. Debtor
country authorities must issue millions of dollars worth of local currency
to be exchanged for the foreign debt; many debtor country central banks
rest of the bank's loans to Brazil will also have to be marked down to that price. William Ollard,
The Debt Swappers, EuROMONEY, Aug. 1986, at 67, 74.
117. SwAP GoiDE, supra note 57, Key Legal, Tax and Accounting Considerations for Debt-
Equity Swaps at 8. The Financial Accounting Standards Board has established a standard that
revolves around the "allocation of the purchase price to fair values," which requires proper
structuring of the transaction to maximize accounting and tax benefits. Id. at 10.
118. Regulation K governs the foreign investment activity of U.S. banking institutions, and
was modified in 1987 and again in February 1988 to allow for more flexibility to U.S. banks
in investing in equity ownership in nonfinancial companies. Id. at 3.
119. If banks acquire more than 25% of a private nonfinancial company, current rules require
another shareholder to have a greater share to share the operational responsibility and risk. Id.
at 4.
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procure the local currency by printing it Second, debt-equity swap programs
are criticized as subsidizing foreign investments that would have been made
even without the program. Third, debt-equity swaps are blamed contributing
to capital flight, as local investors take their foreign currency holdings
offshore to become eligible for the swap program. Debtor country nationals
also participate in "round-tripping," where they take the local currency
proceeds of a debt-equity swap, convert them back into foreign currency
on the black market, buy more debt on the secondary market, and so on.
These concerns are significant but can be addressed by a properly
conceived and implemented debt-swap program. A more fundamental
question is whether debtor countries should participate in debt-equity swaps
at all. In the long run, debt-equity swap programs could prove more
expensive for a debtor country than just repaying the debt itself; by
exchanging bad debt for good equity, debtor countries transform a finite
debt obligation into an "open-ended foreign exchange drain."'' 20 Moreover,
why should debtor countries convert debt instruments that will probably
never be repaid into foreign ownership and control over the "commanding
heights" of the local economy?' 2 ' Debt-equity swaps can also reduce flows
of investment in the form of cash into the debtor country.122 Finally, debt-
equity swaps make debt restructurings more difficult for the debtor countries
by providing an "exit vehicle" for creditor banks that are not enthusiastic
about extending new loans.
2) Benefits
Advocates of debt-equity swaps maintain that a properly structured
program can minimize the drawbacks mentioned above and also provide
other benefits that could not be attained through debt restructuring. 2 1 The
relatively small size of most debt-equity swap programs limits the
inflationary impact of debt swaps. Moreover, inflationary pressures can
120. Hilton, supra note 71, at 11.
121. One former Argentine official explained his preference for a restructuring agreement
over debt-equity swaps by asking why he should choose to pay now, rather than in fifteen years,
as allowed after restructuring negotiations. Stephanie Cooke, Salvaging Debt-Equity Swaps,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 1989, at 149. A former Chilean central bank official opposed
swaps because the depressed state of the Chilean economy lowered equity prices and enabled
creditor banks to exchange bad debt for good equity; in Chile, post-tax profit rates for the compa-
nies chosen for debt-equity swaps were higher than interest rates. Interview with Ricardo Ffrench-
Davis, C.T.C. REP., Spring 1987, at 35.
122. In Chile, direct foreign investment increased under the debt-equity swap program, but
the increase was entirely composed of debt conversions, and the amount of actual cash invested
declined sharply. This drop in cash FDI was greater than the reduction in interest payments,
before even taking into account the potential outflow of dividend payments. Interview with Ricardo
Ffrench-Davis, supra note 121, at 33.
123. U.N. GUIDE, supra note 51, at 35-39.
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be reduced further by imposing ceilings on the amount of debt eligible for
conversion within a given time frame.' 24 Programs can be devised to
promote "additional"'25 investment by using eligibility restrictions or other
means. Similarly, "round-tripping" can be reduced by paying the debt
conversion proceeds into special accounts.' 26
More importantly, debt-equity swaps can bring many advantages beyond
the liquidity relief and debt reduction available after restructuring
negotiations."2' Debt-equity swaps attract "additional" investment by granting
investors an upfront discount or subsidy. It is important to note that this
subsidy is not paid by the debtor country itself, but by the original creditor
that sells its debt for a steep discount on the secondary market."2 These
investments provide a valuable spark for economic growth, especially in
countries that otherwise find it difficult to attract foreign investors. Foreign
interest in taking equity stakes often "snowballs," leading to increased
investment of a more direct nature. A successful debt-equity swap program
also has substantial "second order" benefits such as increasing tax revenues,
employment, and foreign exchange reserves, and showing foreign and
domestic investors that the debtor country is committed to developing a
favorable business climate. Foreign investors can also prove a source of
valuable skills and technology to improve the productivity of the local
workforce. In particular, debt-equity swap programs can give a real boost
to the local financial sector and capital markets.
Debt-equity swaps provide the financing necessary to expand the private
sector and are well-suited for use in conjunction with a privatization
program. 29 First, the debt swap program serves as a valuable market-based
mechanism for channeling investment into the private sector or privatiz.ation
efforts.") Second, debt-equity programs built around a privatization program
largely eliminate any inflationary impact, because the foreign investor
receives government-owned shares in privatizing companies instead of local
currency.' Finally, debt-equity swaps are advantageous because they
124. U.N. GUIDE, supra note 51, at 43.
125. Additional in the sense that these investments would not have been made without the
debt-equity swap program.
126. See, e.g., Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 92, at 555 (a discussion of the Mexican requirement
of special accounts in their debt-equity swap program.)
127. Besides providing benefits in their own right, the offer of debt-equity swaps can often
be a useful card for getting better terms at debt restructuring talks. Cooke, supra note 121, at
149.
128. Interview with Susan L Segal, C.T.C. REP., Spring 1987, at 32.
129. U.N. GUIDE, supra note 51, at 35-39.
130. Id.
131. SwAP GUIDE, supra note 57, Debt-Equity Swap Update (Nov. 1991), at 3.
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replace a fixed debt repayment stream with dividend streams that will rise
and fall with the economic conditions in the debtor country.' 32 The equity
will prove altogether worthless if the investment project is unsuccessful.
In light of the relative advantages and disadvantages of debt-equity
swaps, it seems that they can play a useful but limited role in facilitating
debt reduction and economic growth. 133 The ideal program would attract
additional investment in export sectors and would increase the private
sector's access to long-term capital by developing the local capital market.
It cannot be overemphasized that the program must be very carefully
tailored to the individual country's needs; the regulations will determine
whether debt swaps' drawbacks will be minimized or exaggerated. Debtor
countries are well-advised to seek expert assistance from multilateral
organizations such as the IFC in devising their swap programs. Vague,
poorly drafted regulations that fail to adequately define eligible types of
investment or that impose onerous currency limitations to prevent "round-
tripping" can cripple a swap program.
Beyond the swap regulations themselves, it is critical that any debt-
equity program be part of a general improvement of the investment climate.
Without a stable business environment, debt-equity swaps will not attract
foreign investors or flight capital. As countries recognize the vital role of
private investors in spurring economic development, they can look to debt-
equity swaps to finance privatization programs (which do not have
inflationary impact), infrastructure projects (for which financing is otherwise
hard to find), and hard-currency generating projects in the export or tourism
sectors.
Candid assessment of the political situation in the debtor country is
crucial when formulating a debt-equity swap program.' Popular reaction
against granting investment privileges to foreigners may prove a serious
obstacle. The political impact of a program can be minimized by restricting
it to enterprises in special economic zones, or by placing certain sectors
of the economy off-limits. Swaps must become apolitical and routine and
must not become a contentious political issue in the debtor country.
Even the most successful debt-equity swap program cannot be
maintained indefinitely. Debt-equity swap programs tend to operate in
cycles. Programs that attract too much investment will either drive up the
secondary market price to the point that debt swaps are no longer attractive
132. U.N. GUIDE, supra note 51, at 35, 37-38.
133. Antoine Basile, The Role of Debt-Equity Conversions in Attracting FDI, C.T.C. REP.,
Autumn 1989, at 58. With its debt-equity swap program, Chile reduced its foreign debt by $1.2
billion out of combined commercial bank debt of $16 billion, or 6% of Chile's foreign debt.
Interview with Susan L Segal, supra note 128, at 32.
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or spark restrictive changes to the swap programs themselves." The
secondary maket discount on developing country debt also shrinks to the
point of nonattractiveness as general economic conditions improve in debtor
countries and the prospect of regular servicing improves. Eventually,
investors will increasingly rely on conventional foreign investment programs
instead of the debt-equity mechanism. This signals the imminent return
of the debtor country to the international financial fold.
Ultimately, debt-equity swaps can never provide more than a partial
solution to a country's debt problems because there are limited attractive
investment targets in any particular debtor country, and because many of
the most indebted countries owe money as official debt that is not typically
eligible for debt-swap programs.
The previous discussion outlines the possible positive and negative
outcomes of a debt-equity swap program, but does not consider how to
maximize the benefits; the devil is in making the difficult value and policy
decisions necessary to make the program successful.
E. Policy Questions in Establishing a Debt-Equity Swap Program
To draw up their debt-equity program, debtor country authorities must
address a series of policy questions regarding the objectives, scope, and
procedures of the program. Once the program is designed, it must be
implemented; special challenges await those hoping to implement swap
programs in countries with "weak leadership, corrupt bureaucracies, almost
nonexistent capital markets and faltering economies.' 35
The following policy considerations must be addressed when formulating
a debt-equity swap program. First, the debtor country authorities must
134. Note the cyclical nature of debt-equity swap volumes between 1985 and 1990:
DEBT-EQuITY SWAPS 1985-1990 ($ Millions)
Country: 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Argentina 467 - - 1,354 514 5,796
Brazil 530 206 300 5,115 4,724 483
Chile 332 981 1,950 2,762 2,778 1,103
Mexico - 363 1,786 2,919 2,546 652
Venezuela - - - 47 656 405
THE WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK INFO. BRIEFS (The World Bank, Wash. D.C.), #C.04.8-92,
at 2.
135. Cooke, supra note 121, at 149.
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establish the goals of the program. At least four different primary objectives
are possible: 36 (1) a reduction of external debt; (2) the promotion of
additional investment; (3) the promotion of development in certain sectors
or regions; and (4) the repatriation of flight capital. Although these
objectives are not mutually exclusive, neither are they fully compatible.
Trade-offs must be made as the debtor country proceeds toward the
realization of one objective or another. For instance, a program that
emphasizes debt reduction needs a large volume of debt swap activity and
must encourage all investment, whether or not it is additional. Debtor
country authorities will seek to capture a large portion of the secondary
market discount for the government but will maintain lax screening and
approval procedures. However, authorities that want to structure their
program to encourage additional investment must institute a much more
selective screening process to ensure that the investment would not be made
without the swap program. This will reduce conversion volume and thus
the amount of debt reduced.
Once the authorities have selected their program's primary objective,
they must decide on the form the program is to take. Should the program
be built around a formal, transparent program with established procedures,
or should it be informal, with debt-equity swaps negotiated on a case-by-
case basis in the absence of any specific authorizing legislation?'37
Whichever form of program is chosen, four sets of questions must be
addressed: (1) eligibility criteria; (2) conversion procedures; (3) financial
concerns; and (4) control issues. 3 .
1) Eligibility Criteria 139
Who will be eligible to participate in the swap program? Limiting
participation to foreigners will reduce the repatriation of flight capital and
will have an adverse long-term effect on the debtor country's balance of
payments, because local investors would be less likely to transfer income
streams abroad in the future. However, the political repercussions of
allowing local citizen participation are particularly troublesome when it
allows widespread laundering of illegal profits. Limiting eligibility to
foreigners will provoke angry calls for equal privileges for locals, but
136. JOHN D. SCHILLING ET AL., DEBT EQUITY CONVERSION ANALYSIS: A CASE STUDY
OF THE PHILIPPINE PROGRAM, at 3-4 (1990).
137. An informal program is often considered better when significant political opposition
to debt-equity swaps can be expected and authorities want to maintain a very low profile. Hilton,
supra note 71, at 9.
138. U.N. GUIDE, supra note 51, at 106-10.
139. Hilton, supra note 71, at 9.
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allowing domestic investors to participate will eventually prove politically
difficult, as illicit foreign currency hoards are in essence laundered into
equity in blue-chip local enterprises through the official debt swap program.
What kind of swap will be allowed? Although most countries allow
virtually any form of swap, some programs only allow swaps by the original
creditor or between a foreign corporation and a local subsidiary.
What kind of debt should be eligible? The authorities can authorize
conversions of limited amounts of government debt, all private or public
sector debt, or somewhere in between. Their choice largely depends on
the amount of debt that the country wants to see converted and on the
potential economic and political impact of the program. Most countries
restrict eligible debt to long-term debt already covered by one rescheduling
agreement (regardless of who originally held the debt) and exclude short-
term debt or trade credit. However, some countries, such as Nigeria, permit
conversion of short term trade-related debt." Mexico's program from
1985-1987 was among the most restrictive; only debt that had been
rescheduled and that had been originally issued by a bank that had recently
agreed to provide new loans could be converted.
What kind of investment will be eligible?.4' Choices concerning
investment eligibility criteria are particularly important and depend upon
the primary objective of the swap program. Some countries impose
essentially no restrictions except for their defense and communications sec-
tors," while others limit investment to the export or import substitution
sectors. Others give graduated incentives to investors according to
investment priorities established by the debtor government, based upon
key industrial sectors or depressed regions. 43
Another issue is whether investment in stock funds (i.e., secondary
investment on local stock markets) is eligible; this will increase activity
on local capital markets but may also divert capital from higher priority
direct investment.
2) The Conversion Procedure
Administration of the swap program. The Central Bank and Finance
Ministry generally administer debt-equity swap programs, but usually several
different ministries become involved in dealing with the range of issues
presented by debt-equity swaps. Some mechanism is necessary to avoid
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 10.
143. Tourism and privatization are favorite target sectors; target regions are typically either
free economic zones or underdeveloped regions.
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ministerial deadlock. The Philippines established an interdepartmental
agency with representatives from all relevant ministries to allow a "one-
stop" swap application and approval process. 44
Allocation of debt conversion rights. In most official programs, debt
conversion rights are allocated through formal auctions. At the auctions,
investors bid by offering the government an increasingly larger local
currency "discount" on the foreign debt being converted. The winner is
the investor that agrees to give up the largest portion of the local currency
proceeds to the debtor country government. The size of the discount
investors are willing to bid depends upon the price of the debt on the
secondary market and the appeal of the investment opportunity. In addition
to the auction discounts, investors must often pay fees to the debtor
government or local financial intermediaries. 4 The authorities must also
resolve several other questions.'" Who will run the auctions? Can investors
bid directly, or must they bid through local financial intermediaries? Will
the authorities wield a veto in screening procedures that determine who
is eligible to participate in the auction?
Other programs, particularly informal programs, allocate debt conversion
rights by individual review and negotiation of each proposed investment
between the investor and the authorities, with the rights going to the
investors with the proposals best suited to the current priorities of the swap
program. This approach is often criticized for its lack of transparency and
potential for corruption and other vices, but it has the advantage of
minimizing the potential political problems of a transparent, nondiscretionary
program.
Argentina's swap program uses both systems, with a preliminary case-
by-case screening followed by formal auctions. 47 Other countries administer
two sets of auctions, for investment in normal and priority regions.
Disbursal Procedures. Disbursal procedures often prove to be the most
difficult facet of a debt-equity swap program. The Central Bank cannot
simply hand the investor the local currency proceeds of the swap because
of concerns about inflationary pressures and round-tripping. Mexico's
program in 1985-1987 deposited swap proceeds in a government-adminis-
tered account that could not be drawn upon without proper invoices
evidencing valid expenses of the investment project." Other programs issue




148. Id. at 11.
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local-currency denominated bonds with staggered maturities. Privatization
programs simplify the process, by allowing the government to issue
privatization vouchers in lieu of cash.
3) Financial Issues
Exchange Rate. A basic swap uses an exchange rate close to the official
rate. In an auction system, investors bid by increasing the discount based
on the official rate. In case-by-case negotiations, an investor negotiates
the exchange rate to be used. Debtor countries must recognize that at some
point, an unfavorable exchange rate will offset any advantages from the
swap and foreign investors will refuse to participate.
Fees. Programs vary in their fee structure, but almost all investors will
have to pay a fee to their debt broker for assembling the debt package.
Debtor countries often impose central bank fees or require that investors
be represented by local financial intermediaries during the swap auctions
or applications.
Variable priority-determined financial incentives. Sometimes authorities
try to channel investment into special priority sectors or regions by offering
a graduated scale of financial incentives. Brazil presents investors with two
different sets of incentives: one for investment in normal regions, and a
more attractive set for investment in priority regions. Mexico has a complex
schedule of financial incentives based upon the priority of investment sector.
Matching funds requirement. Almost all debt-equity swap programs
provide only local currency for the converted debt. Any necessary imported
equipment or supplies requires an injection of new cash; most debt-equity
swap programs thus have a de facto new money requirement. 49 A few
debtor countries impose matching fund requirements that mandate a certain
amount of foreign currency exchanged at the official exchange rate for every
dollar converted via swaps. Such requirements are quite unpopular with
investors, particularly banks, and diminish the attractiveness of the debt
swap program.
Tax regime. Tax treatment is yet another complex issue. It is debatable
whether debt swappers should enjoy additional benefits in the form of tax
incentives not provided to conventional investors and local nationals. The
taxation of dividends and capital gains must also be addressed. The issue
is complicated by the tax consequences of a debt-equity swap in the
investor's country.
Restrictions on remittance of dividends and repatriation of capital.
Almost all programs place restrictions on the remittance of dividends and
149. ld at 10.
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the repatriation of capital. Generally, such restrictions should correspond
to the returns permitted by the terms of the underlying debt.
4) Controlling Macro Concerns
Inflationary effects. Inflationary effects are often cited as one of the
chief drawbacks of debt-equity swap programs. Debt-equity swap programs
add to the domestic money supply by converting foreign debt into local
currency, thus increasing the money supply and causing inflation. One
solution is to "sterilize" the inflationary impact by issuing local currency
bonds instead of cash for the swapped debt. This policy often results in
higher local interest rates and a diversion of capital from domestic
investment opportunities. Another solution is to place a cap on the amount
of debt to be converted either by setting auction quotas or by monitoring
on-going swap transactions. Privatization vouchers are another option.
Inflationary concerns are real, but often exaggerated. 50 First, the
relatively small size of most debt-equity swap programs would limit the
effect on the monetary supply. Second, most countries in the position to
implement debt-equity swaps already have monthly inflation rates in double
digits; the marginal inflationary effects of a debt-equity swap program would
be minimal. '5
Political Concerns. Political concerns are often determinative. The
slightest appearance of government subsidies for foreign investors or foreign
domination of key sectors of the economy can prove a very divisive political
issue. There are several ways to limit the political opposition to a swap
program. 5 1 It is possible to restrict the size, scope, and "profile" of the
program. Also, the debtor country can use the IMF or Western banks as
scapegoats. Opening the program to local investors as well as foreigners
will also help reduce opposition, as will increasing public awareness of
the jobs that foreign investment can provide. Finally, foreigners may be
restricted to minority holdings in some or all sectors of the economy. The
best approach might involve combining several of these measures.
III. FOUR DEBT-EQUITY SWAP PROGRAMS
Many countries have introduced debt-equity swap programs in the wake
of Chile's success. Not all countries' debt-equity swaps have proved as
successful as Chile's; moreover, each scheme is different. The profiles below
are intended to illustrate the approaches that various countries have taken
in designing debt-equity swap programs.
150. For example, Chile, which has the largest debt-equity program of any country, has
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A. Chile
Chile's debt-equity swap program is often regarded the most successful
and significant swap program because of the volume of debt converted,
the level of interest exhibited by foreign investors, and the general lack
of political opposition that it evoked in Chile. The primary objective of
the Chilean program was to reduce foreign debt, so the program allowed
many types of debt conversion, not just debt-equity swaps. By late 1989,
Chile's debt conversion program had converted $8.1 billion in debt, with
over $5 billion in debt-equity swaps.'
Chile adopted debt-equity swaps in response to the severe economic
problems that accompanied the debt crisis. Although Chile's external debt
stood at less than $5 billion in 1976, it had jumped to $17 billion by 1982.
With the onset of the debt crisis in 1982, Chile's GDP dropped by 14.1%,
and private investment dropped by more than fifty percent." Although
most Chilean debt was initially held by the private sector, by 1986 the
Chilean government had agreed to assume direct or indirect responsibility
for eighty percent of Chile's external debt, up from thirty-eight percent
in 1982.'
Chile introduced its pioneering debt-equity swap program in May 1985
as Chapters 18 and 19 of the foreign exchange regulations. 5 6 Chapter 18
converts foreign debt into domestic debt and is intended primarily for
Chilean nationals, although foreign investors may also use it. Chapter 19
converts foreign debt into domestic equity and is only open to foreigners.'57
Decree Law 600 (DL 600), the basic foreign investment law, also authorizes
debt-equity swaps.
Chile's debt-equity swap program prioritizes the export and import-
substitution sectors and privatization projects. All investors had to use a
local bank to convert the foreign debt into domestic currency.
Chile chose to allow local investor participation in its swap program
through Chapter 18. Chapter 18 investors did not have to reveal the source
of their funds, which could be converted into local currency without
restrictions on its use, but they were not provided access to official foreign
153. U.N. Guide, supra note 51, at 10.
154. MARY L. WILLIAMSON, DEBT CONVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA: PANACEA OR PANDEMIC?
11-13 (Overseas Development Council Policy Essay No. 2, Richard E. Feinberg ed., 1991).
155. Id. at 12-14.
156. SwAP GuIDE, supra note 57, Country Chapters: Chile at 1.
157. In 1986, Chapter 19 swaps accounted for perhaps 40% of completed transactions; the
remaining 60% were Chapter 18 swaps undertaken by Chilean nationals repatriating flight capital.
Steve H. Hanke, The Anatomy of a Successful Debt Swap, in PRIVATIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT
161, 166-7 (Steven H. Hanke ed., 1987).
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exchange reserves for capital repatriation or remittance of dividends.' To
limit the inflationary effects of the swaps, the Central Bank imposed ceilings
on the amount of debt that could be converted at the monthly auctions. 59
Originally, Chapter 18 funds could only be used for equity investment
or debt reduction. Later, they could also be used for almost any type of
investment. Most swaps have been used to refinance foreign debt into local
debt with better terms."W To reduce the number of nationals using offshore
corporations to invest through Chapter 19, Chilean authorities eventually
added Annex 4 to Chapter 18 to allow nationals to invest in local firms
with the same review procedures as in Chapter 19.
The terms of Chapter 19, which allows foreign equity investment via
debt cancellation, are generally more attractive than Chapter 18.161 Chapter
19 provides for access to foreign exchange at the official rate for future
repatriation of foreign currency but is not open to resident nationals. Chilean
authorities review each investment proposal under Chapter 19 and generally
ration approvals to serve monetary ends or to target priority investment
sectors. Central bank approval under Chapter 19 is discretionary, with the
central bank retaining the right to reject applications without explanation.
The applications were screened to ensure investor eligibility and to
158. WILLIAMSON, supra note 154, at 19.
159. Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 92, at 542. Chapter 18 local investors are assumed to be
buying dollars on the unofficial market, and the quotas are imposed in part to prevent a wide
divergence between official and unofficial exchange rates; Central Bank measures helped keep
the margin down to less than 2.4% in August 1990. See SWAP GUIDE, supra note 57, Country
Chapters: Chile at 2.
160. SWAP GUIDE, supra note 57, Country Chapters: Chile at 5. Such a transaction would
work in the following manner: A Chilean investor would have a debt broker locate eligible Chilean
debt selling for perhaps 67% of face value. The broker would then submit a sealed bid for a
"ration coupon" to the central bank, indicating the discount that the investor is willing to grant
to the central bank in return for the right to convert the external debt into domestic debt. These
ration coupons allowed Chilean monetary authorities to "sterilize" the monetary impact of debt-
equity swaps by setting a monthly quota (ration coupons) for the amount of permitted swaps.
If the investor's sealed bid were accepted by the central bank, the investor would then proceed
to purchase the foreign debt instrument which is then converted into a peso-denominated debt
instrument that is indexed to Chilean inflation. This domestic debt instrument would then be
placed in the local capital market for sale, where it would typically fetch 92% of par value, which
would finally be delivered to the Chilean investor after the debt broker had received another
four percent in fees. Hanke, supra note 157, at 166-67. Thus, the central bank captured an eight
percent discount, and domestic financial markets captured another four percenL Under the program,
Chilean banks earned more than twenty-five percent of their profits from fees and commissions
generated by debt-equity swaps. U.N. GUIDE, supra note 51, at 82-84.
161. From 1985-1990, more than $3.5 billion in Chilean debt was converted into equity
investment through Chapter 19, representing about one third of Chile's external debt reduction.
Screening procedures were meant to eliminate "round-tripping" and promote additionality. The
applicable regulations were largely developed during negotiations concerning the first Chapter
19 investment in June 1985; the regulations were elaborated as other investment applications
were submitted. See JOHN M. KLINE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT STRATEGIES IN RESTRUCTURING
ECONOMIES: LEARNING FROM CORPORATE EXPERIENCES IN CHILE 28-30 (1992).
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determine the economic benefit of particular projects. 62 Despite the extent
of the authorities' discretion over the review process, participants found
central bank officials reasonably fair and objective. The officials were
usually willing to pass their concerns on to investors to negotiate a more
acceptable deal.' 63 Although Chile's program had no formal "new money"
requirement, authorities often recommended that investors fund part of the
investment with cash when they deemed the project "non-additional".'"
As the program progressed, the central bank restricted the use of swap funds
for buy-outs while allowing the use of equity to expand a plant's capacity."c
Chile did not impose a ceiling on the amount of debt that could be
converted.'66 After four years, investors were allowed to remit twenty-five
percent of profits, while capital could not be repatriated for at least ten
years. Changes introduced in 1991 allowed immediate remittance of profits
and repatriation of capital after three years if the investor paid an "exit
fee."
167
When the program was established, investors could use Chapter 19
proceeds for virtually any type of investment.s Gradually, Chilean
authorities restricted authorized swaps to direct investment into priority
sectors such as exports or import substitution, particularly telecommuni-
cations, tourism, and banking."6
DL 600, Chile's general direct foreign investment law, allows for a
firm's debt to be converted into equity in that firm. Investors utilizing DL
600 swaps did not pick up the secondary market discount, but were allowed
to remit dividends immediately and repatriate capital within three years.
These swap provisions can only be used to add to an existing investment
and must be approved by the Foreign Investment Committee instead of
the central bank. 71
162. Central bank authorities generally considered four factors when evaluating the economic
desirability of an investment: (1) the economic sector of the proposed investment; (2) the investor's
contribution of "new money" to the project; (3) the extent to which the investment involves the
introduction of new production capacity versus buy-out of existing firm, privatization, etc.; and
(4) the investment's likely effect on Chile's current account balance. WILLIAMSON, supra note
154, at 22.
163. Id. at 21. Part of the negotiations was the kind of discount that the investor was willing
to grant the Chilean government.
164. Id. at 23.
165. Id. at 24.
166. SwAP GUIDE, supra note 57, Country Chapters: Chile at 1.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 4.
169. In 1987, Chapter 19 was amended to allow for the use of Chapter 19 money in special
investment funds. Until the regulations changed to prohibit investments in such funds, they proved
to be popular with foreign banks.
170. Only $273 million had been converted under DL 600 by the end of 1989. SwAP GUIDE,
supra note 57, Country Chapters: Chile at 1. Between 1985 and 1989, only three percent of
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Informal debt conversions also played a major role in the Chilean debt-
swap program.' These transactions were conducted directly between
Chilean debtors and their foreign creditors, without central bank involve-
ment. 172
Chile's program has been very successful at reducing foreign debt and
attracting foreign investment. By the end of 1989, the Chilean program
had converted more than $8 billion out of $14.5 billion in eligible debt. 1
The program has been credited with renewing flows of foreign direct
investment to Chile and accounted for more than sixty percent of new
investments registered between 1985-1988.174 The swaps financed projects
in a variety of sectors; thiry-eight percent of swaps involved manufacturing
projects, twenty-five percent agriculture and fishing, eleven percent were
in the financial sector, and nineteen percent were in commercial projects.
The debt-equity swap program can also be credited with contributing to
a more diversified export base by encouraging investment into nontraditional
export sectors, although Chile's improving general economic conditions
probably played the major role in Chile's success in increasing exports.'
The program slowed, however, as its success depleted stocks of eligible
debt and exhausted the attractive investment opportunities presented by
the first wave of privatization. Swap transactions in Chile dropped from
$1.3 billion in 1989 to $412 million in 1990 to $20 million in 1991. The
shortage of debt drove up the secondary market price and increased winning
discount bids at the Central Bank debt auction to between twenty-five and
twenty-seven percent. 76 As demand for Chilean debt increased, Chilean
authorities also placed increasing restrictions on debt transactions intended
to channel debt-equity into priority areas.
Two characteristics of the Chilean program should be noted. First,
participants in the open market, not the central bank, performed debt
debt-equity swaps took the form of D.L. 600 investments. WILLIAMSON, supra note 154, at 25.
171. Through mid-1990, almost one-third of recorded debt-equity swaps were conducted
on an informal basis. WILLIAMSON, supra note 154, at 26.
172. Id. at 27.
173. $2.54 billion under Chapter 18, $3.16 billion under Chapter 19, and the remainder
under DL 600 transactions and Chilean government debt buy-backs. SWAP GUIDE, supra note
57, Country Chapters: Chile at 1. The program was a success almost immediately, converting
$121 million under Chapter 19 alone in first nine months of operation. Ollard, supra note 116,
at 71. A former Deputy Manager of the Central Bank of Chile claims that the official conversion
figures are misleading and discounts many of the supposed benefits of Chile's program. Interview
with Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, supra note 121, at 33.
174. U.N. GUIDE, supra note 51, at 83.
175. WILLIAMSON, supra note 154, at 39.
176. SWAP GUIDE, supra note 57, Country Chapters: Chile at 10.
177. KLINE, supra note 161, at 32-33.
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valuation and conversion. The central bank limited its role to controlling
the monetary impact by setting the required discount for the ration coupons
and determining which of the sealed bids met this price. Second, Chile
has a well-developed, liquid capital market in which long-term debt
instruments are actively traded and which is large enough to allow the
central bank to "sterilize" a large volume of swaps. 78
Despite its apparent success, Chile's program has been criticized on
several grounds. The most fundamental criticism is that the swaps did not
serve the best interests of Chile as a whole, but instead benefitted
international and domestic banks and Chilean speculators. 9 Opposition
to Chapter 19 swaps focused on three interrelated issues: First, investment
through debt-equity swaps brought little "new" money into Chile. The
second issue focused on such swaps' lack of additionality. The third issue
was that foreign investors seemed to have an advantage over local investors,
especially when the transaction involved a buy-out of a privatizing firm
instead of a new investment. Such investors received a double-barrelled
discount on Chilean equity: First from the discount achieved in the swap




Brazilian debt-equity swaps date from at least 1978, although interest
remained weak until the onset of the debt crisis in 1982, when declining
direct foreign investment inflows induced Brazilian authorities to increase
interest in debt-equity swaps by introducing tax incentives.18' Swaps were
criticized as reducing foreign direct investment into Brazil, and in 1984
the tax credit was abolished and swaps were restricted to those debts held
by original creditors.'82 These restrictions greatly reduced foreign interest
in the Brazilian swap program, and a new approach was instituted in 1988
with the enactment of Resolution 1460. The chief objective of the new
program was reduction of foreign debt, not attracting foreign investment;
the flexibility of the program allowed Brazil to convert more than $2.7
billion in debt in 1988 alone.
8 3
178. Hanke, supra note 157, at 166-67.
179. U.N. GUIDE, supra note 51, at 84-85.
180. WILLIAMSON, supra note 154, at 24.
181. The program converted only $40-50 million between 1978 and 1981. U.N. GUIDE,
supra note 51, at 9, 74.
182. Id. at 9.
183. ld& at 74. $24 billion was eligible for auction conversion at the beginning of the program.
Id. at 76.
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The program was designed to capture the maximum discount at the
conversion auctions, and placed minimal restrictions on investment activities.
There was no screening procedure for proposed projects, and investment
into swap funds was allowed. Capital could not be repatriated for twelve
years, but the program imposed no special restrictions on remittance of
dividends. The authorities imposed a ceiling of $150 million on the monthly
auctions, and required half of that total for investment in priority underde-
veloped regions. By the last auction in 1988, these and other measures
allowed Brazil to increase the discount captured for the government from
19.58% to 36.98%. ' Informal debt-equity swaps and swaps under the more
restrictive Circulars 1125 and 1303 also continued to play a role.
Brazil's debt-equity swap programs reveal the dangers of ill-conceived
regulations. The restrictions in the early programs caused flows of direct
foreign investment to plunge.IS5 The 1988 program remedied this problem
by yielding to creditors' pressure to relax the rules and administration of
the program; direct foreign investment returned to traditional levels, but
was accompanied by evidence of "round-tripping" and paper swaps.
I1 6
Critics also blamed Brazil's program for a surge in inflation."7 Half
of the increase in Brazil's money supply was attributed to the "round-
tripping" swaps, which also led to an ever wider gap between official and
black market exchange rates.18 Meanwhile, banks accused the Brazilian
Central Bank officials administering the swap auctions of corruption."'
Only after nine months of hyperinflation and allegations of corruption did
the Finance Ministry suspend further debt swaps. Brazil's debt-equity swap
program resulted in the removal of cash from the country and subsidies
for foreign investment that would have been made even without the
program. 190
Brazil's experience with swaps imparts three general lessons for other
debtor countries. ' First, serious problems result when political factors
preclude a stable regulatory and procedural regime for the swap program,
184. Id. at 78.
185. Id. at 74.
186. Id. at 77. Much of Brazil's 1988 debt conversion was converted for "round-tripping,"
whereby arbitrageurs and banks bought Brazilian debt on the secondary market, swapped it for
crusados under an informal conversion program in Brazil, and then sold the crusados for black
market dollars to be taken back out of the country. The fact that direct foreign investment returned
to traditional levels under this program indicates that the program attracted little additional
investment. Id. at 79.




191. U.N. GUIDE, supra note 51, at 79.
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because constant changes to the program dissuade potential investors.
Second, any program that focuses on reducing foreign debt by capturing
the largest discount in the debt auctions will result in too much
nonadditional investment and round-tripping, because the authorities give
up control over the use of the local currency as the price for the larger
discount. Finally, it is very difficult to establish viable debt swap investment
funds, even in what was perhaps the biggest stock market in the developing
world.
C. Mexico
Debt-equity swaps began in Mexico in the immediate aftermath of the
1982 debt crisis, when multinational corporations began capitalizing debts
to subsidiaries without a formal program. After Chile, Mexico was the first
Latin American nation to institute a formal debt-equity swap program in
July 1986.
Mexico's first debt-equity program was highly structured, with the
primary objective of channeling of investment to priority sectors. 92 Mexico
offered a variable rate of discount on redeemed debt, based on an elaborate
set of priorities devised by the Mexican authorities. 93 To increase the
attractiveness of the program, Mexico did not require any matching funds
and did not place restrictions on the remittance of dividends other than
requiring that they did not exceed the interest payments that they replaced
for the first five years. One major restriction was that foreign investors
were generally limited to a forty-nine percent stake in Mexican companies.
Mexico tried to limit speculative practices by placing the swap proceeds
in a special account and allowing disbursements only after the presentation
of proper invoices for investment-related expenses. The program proved
very popular, but Mexico cancelled the program in late 1987 for fear of
inflationary effects after converting $2.6 billion worth of debt.194
Mexico's program was interesting in two other respects. During
negotiations for a new money agreement with Mexico's creditors, several
banks proved reluctant to provide new loans; Mexico threatened to exclude
192. Mexico was largely successful in this, as illustrated by the sectoral distribution of debt-
equity swaps: Tourism, 30%; automotive, 16%; capital goods, 12%; and export zone assembly
operations, 11%. Id. at 72.
193. For example, investors in high-priority sectors such as privatization or high-technology
exports received 100% of the peso value of the cancelled debt, while investors in lower priority
sectors received a smaller percentage, down to 75% for low priority investments. Asiedu-Akrofi,
supra note 92, at 555-56.
194. SWAP GUIDE, supra note 57, Country Chapters: Mexico at 1. Critics of the program
asserted that every $100 million of converted debt increased inflation by three to five percent.
Aseidu-Akrofi, supra note 92, at 559-60.
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these banks from converting their debt or from participating in any manner
in the next debt swap program. Another interesting aspect was the lack
of opposition to the program from Mexico's highly nationalistic labor unions
and politicians. Mexican authorities successfully presented the program
as a mechanism for reducing debt, not increasing foreign investment. 195
Negotiations with creditors led to the reintroduction of a smaller
program in early 1990, with a cap of $3.5 billion in its forty-two month
lifespan. 96 To limit the monetary impact of the swap program, Mexico
limited the eligible investment to privatization and infrastructure projects.
In addition, the program was to be instituted in a series of auctions to allow
Mexican authorities the opportunity to adjust the regulations for each new
auction. The rules did ease in some respects, however, as foreign investors
are now allowed to own 100% of equity in many sectors. 97 Mexico has
also implemented an innovative approval system. If a project is small (under
$100 million), funded from abroad, outside a major metropolitan center,
expected to keep imports and exports in at least a balance for the first three
years, provides job training and permanent jobs, and meets environmental
standards, then it does not need governmental authorization. Otherwise,
it needs approval by the Foreign Investment Commission. 98 The minimum
discount is set at 35%, and there are no restrictions on remittance of profits
except for some privatization investments!"
D. Argentina
Argentina's original debt-equity swap program extended from October
1987 to March 1989, when further swaps were suspended due to currency
fluctuations and monetary concerns.m Reduction of foreign debt seemed
to be the primary objective of the program, and the Central Bank succeeded
in achieving a steadily increasing discount in swap auctions.2°' The
Argentine program did not impose regional or sectoral priorities on
investors, but most projects involved export-generating enterprises in the
195. Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 92, at 556, 559-60.
196. SWAP GUIDE, supra note 57, Country Chapters: Mexico at 1.
197. Ollard, supra note 116, at 69.
198. SWAP GUIDE, supra note 57, Country Chapters: Mexico at 2.
199. Id. at 4.
200. Argentina first attempt at debt-equity swaps began in late 1984, with a program that
converted debt into promissory notes that could be swapped for equity. This program converted
$500 million during the year it was in existence. The 1987 program retired $2 billion in foreign
debt and brought in $390 million in new money. SWAP GUIDE, supra note 57, Country Chapters:
Argentina at 1.
201. In the first auction, the minimum discount of 25% was easily met, with winning bids
of 36.69%; the minimum discount was repeatedly set higher, until average discounts reached
77.3% in March 1989. SWAP GUIDE, supra note 57, Country Chapters: Argentina at 1.
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Buenos Aires area. In contrast to Brazil and Chile, Argentina limited eligible
investments to new projects that would result in increased production, as
opposed to buy-outs or restructurings that merely transferred existing
assets' Argentina also imposed a matching fund requirement to ensure
that investors bring in new capital.2°3 Argentine companies and individuals
were also allowed to participate in the program, helping repatriate flight
capital.' Finally, remittance of dividends was allowed after four years,
and capital could be repatriated after ten years. °5
Argentina's lack of well-developed, long-term capital markets and
unstable inflationary situation precluded the use of long-term bonds to
sterilize the capital inflows, so the authorities imposed annual conversion
ceilings of $300 million to $400 million and allowed swaps in conjunction
with the ongoing privatization program.
The program seemed to generate quality investment in the form of new
productive capacity before its suspension in early 1989. One criticism of
the program, however, was that it was structured to capture the largest
possible discount for the Central Bank, but did not allow the authorities
to grant conversion rights to truly additional investment. Almost a third
of the swaps under the program were directed at investment into agro-
industries, where Argentina's comparative advantage would seem to indicate
that these swaps merely served to replace normal flows of direct foreign
investment. By trying to capture the largest possible share of the discount
on the secondary market, Argentine authorities authorized virtually all
investments and virtually lost control over which projects would actually
obtain debt conversion rights. Within the pool of approved investments,
the projects that could afford to offer the winning bids were often those
that would have been made even without the swap program.207 Another
criticism of the Argentine program involved the size of the completed debt-
equity swaps. Unlike in Mexico and Chile, most of the swaps in Argentina
involved relatively small projects.2 8 Although foreign investors did not
find many large projects in Argentina worth investing in, the auction
202. This feature of the program and the matching fund requirement reduced the participation
of international banks, which prefer to swap into a passive equity stake rather than a more active
investment posture.
203. Only 70% of an investment could be funded via swaps, with 30% required in new
money. SWAP GUIDE, supra note 57, Country Chapters: Argentina at 2.
204. Ollard, supra note 116, at 73.
205. SWAP GUIDE, supra note 57, Country Chapters: Argentina at 6.
206. U.N. GUIDE, supra note 51, at 87-88. In contrast, Chile allowed very little swap activity
in its areas of comparative advantage, such as mining, and normal foreign investment flows
remained strong.
207. See id. at 89.
208. Id. at 88.
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mechanism also slightly favored small and medium-sized enterprises by
imposing a ceiling on auctioned debt that was too low to allow
megaprojects. 2°
Argentina's debt-equity program was revived in the summer of 1990
in conjunction with a new privatization program.210 Entel, the Argentine
telephone company, was the first company privatized. Sixty percent of the
company was sold through debt-equity swaps, with shares going to those
bidding the highest face value of Argentine debt.2 ' The base price was
$3.5 billion, but investors bid the total up to $5 billion in debt (purchased
for $1 billion on the secondary market) and an additional $600 million
in new investment. The Argentine airline, Aerolineas Argentinas, was also
privatized, with eighty-five percent of the shares going for $2 billion in
debt (purchased for $400 million). Argentina thus reduced its foreign debt
by $7 billion, or twenty percent of outstanding commercial bank debt,
through the sale of only two state-owned companies.212
Since Economics Minister Domingo Cavallo introduced Argentina's
privatization program, it has cancelled out $7.6 billion in debt; by the
completion of the program, Argentina will have sold off a list of sixty
Argentine enterprises and reduced foreign debt by $10 billion.213 The federal
government has also seen tax revenues increase by sixty percent and has
reduced the flow of these tax revenues to the provinces. Cavallo hopes that
the private sector will increase productivity and tax revenues enough to
improve Argentina's economic position.214 Besides increasing Argentina's
tax revenues, the privatization has allowed the government to reduce
expensive budget subsidies to inefficient state firms. The Argentine
authorities helped increase the popularity of the program by diverting some
of the proceeds to increase employee pension funds.21 5
E. Lessons from Latin American Debt-Equity Swap Programs
Latin America's experience with debt-equity swaps provides valuable
lessons for those considering a debt-swap program in other countries.
209. Id. at 86.
210. SWAP GUIDE, supra note 57, Country Chapters: Argentina, Debt-Equity Swap Update
(August 1990).
211. This procedure was intended at least in part to avoid the practical and political difficulties
of valuating the assets of the privatizing enterprises. WOONKI SUNG & ROSARIA TROIA,
DEVELOPMENTS IN DEBT CONVERSION PROGRAMS AND CONVERSION ACTIVITIES 35 (World Bank
Technical Paper No. 170, 1992).
212. Id.; WILLIAMSON, supra note 154, at 56.
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Besides illustrating the general features common to most debt-equity swap
programs, the Latin American experience demonstrates how to reinforce
the positive aspects of a debt-equity swap program. Most debt-equity swap
programs are similar in their goals, investor incentives, and ultimate
consequences. 216
1) Goals
First, achieving rapid debt reduction through an early rush of deals
is usually unwise in debt-equity programs because the debtor country is
merely attracting nonadditional investment at the cost of incurring large
long-term foreign exchange liabilities.
Second, debt-equity swaps are most important to countries seeking to
win back the confidence of creditors and investors in order to regain access
to international capital markets. However, debtor countries must be careful
not to implement a swap program before the necessary degree of economic
stabilization has occurred and should ensure that the debt conversions are
limited to sustainable volumes. Efforts to improve relations with creditors
and investors could be hampered by an excessive emphasis on increasing
the benefits accruing to the host country.
Third, debt-equity swaps can play a major role in a privatization
program. Such transactions are non-inflationary and may ease some political
problems of privatization by allowing foreign investors to pay a higher
local currency price for the enterprise. Governments can help by reducing
the secondary market discount that they retain for themselves. For example,
Mexico redeemed debt at full face value for privatization investments. Other
countries forbid privatization swap transactions or prohibit investors from
acquiring majority stakes through swaps.17
2) Investor Incentives
a) Debtor governments can enhance the additionality of the new
investments by promoting export and nontraditional sectors and by limiting
the use of swaps to finance buy-outs of existing enterprises or limiting
investment into sectors where the country has a competitive advantage.
b) Debt-equity swaps offer particularly attractive investment incentives
because they can be large and are up-front discounts, unlike most financial
216. WILLIAMSON, supra note 154, at 65.
217. Some debtor countries prohibit or restrict swap transactions in privatization programs
because they are loath to give up major stakes in state-owned enterprises to foreigners at the
discounted fire-sale prices attainable in many debt-equity swap programs. JOEL BERGSMAN &
WAYNE EDisis, DEBT-EQUITY SWAPS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA,
16 (1988).
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incentives, which are either delayed or dependant on uncertain future
events.218 Debt-equity swaps are particularly attractive for multinational
corporations because the swap grants them the equivalent of an up-front
cash grant which reduces the amount the investor places at risk and lowers
the required rate of return.
c) Debt swap programs are more likely to encourage export-oriented
investment, while investment aimed at domestic markets tends to be based
upon strategic considerations and will be made with or without the debt
swap program (i.e., such investment is "nonadditional"). Investment
decisions on projects aimed at the domestic market are chiefly determined
by strategic market considerations, and companies will only invest for
"sound business reasons" despite incentives offered by swap programs.
In addition, up-front incentives have greater effect on export-oriented
manufacturing (as opposed to resource extraction) projects because costs
are generally more important to export projects as competition in world
markets generally does not allow investors to pass on high costs to
consumers.
d) The effects of swap programs on banks are quite different from their
effects on multinationals. Almost all debt swaps by banks are additional,
in that banks would not otherwise make equity investments.1 9
e) Reasonable restrictions on the amount and timing of dividends and
repatriation of capital should not seriously reduce the attractiveness of the
program. Most investors that choose to participate in the program are in
the country for the long haul. Moreover, such restrictions will improve the
country's short-term balance of payments and divert some nonadditional
investment back into conventional investment channels.'
3) Consequences
a) Countries without well-developed, long-term capital markets must
be especially wary of the inflationary effects of swaps. They must sterilize
the inflationary impact of debt conversions by setting conversion ceilings
and tying them in to privatization programs. Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina
are all examples of large economies that were unable to implement large-
scale debt conversion programs because their underdeveloped capital
markets proved unable to absorb the long-term bonds necessary to sterilize
the monetary impact of the swaps.22
218. Id. at 5.
219. ld
220. Id. at 25.
221. WILLIAMSON, supra note 154, at 61.
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b) Debt swaps facilitate the development of the private sector in the
debtor country by channelling investment capital into productive use in
the private sector, by generating fees for the local financial sector, and by
instilling confidence in the overall investment climate.
c) Successful debt-equity swap programs are "self-terminating" in that
investors drive up the price of the debt on the secondary market and bid
up the discount granted to the debtor government as the stock of debt
available on the secondary market is reduced. Investors lose interest in the
program when rising secondary market prices and growing debtor
government discounts converge, thus eliminating the investor's financial
incentives.
d) Attempts to channel investment into priority sector risk evoking
corruption and favoritism during the selection process. Moreover,
government intervention in the screening process might frustrate efforts
to maximize the benefits of free enterprise in the debtor country.
e) Debt conversions that allow domestic investors to participate on
roughly the same footing as foreigners will draw back flight capital and
reduce the swaps' future foreign exchange costs.
f) Debt-equity swaps, in addition to reducing debt, will either cost the
government foreign exchange (if the investment was not additional) or
require an increase in domestic currency (if the investment was additional),
but not both. If the swap investment is not additional, the swap program
will not have inflationary effects. In other words, a swap program leads
to inflationary impacts only to the extent that investments made under the
plan would not have happened without the swap program.M
g) In countries with underdeveloped capital markets and a shortage
of long-term financing for industrial expansion, swaps can provide an
excellent source of long-term finance. Local companies can either approach
creditor banks, or may use their own hard currency reserves to purchase
debt on the secondary market. In countries with more developed capital
markets, such as Chile, a more common transaction is one in which the
creditor bank will offer to finance most of the investment of a suitable
foreign company in the debtor country if it can find a suitable enterprise. 223
h) Initial observers expected that developing countries would only be
able to absorb a limited number of swap transactions before all of the
country's interesting investment possibilities were sold. Experience has
shown however, that a proper swap program will create new productive
capacity, not just transfer ownership. In fact, an attractive swap program
in an investment-friendly economic environment will generally attract more
investors than the debtor government may want, at least until the depletion
222. BERGSMAN & EDISIS, supra note 217, at 6.
223. Id. at 17.
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of debt stock drives up secondary market prices.224
i) Additionality increases with the duration of the swap program as
investors become aware of the benefits and possibilities of the swap
program.
j) Swaps executed through buy-outs or financial restructuring are
generally followed rather quickly by improvements or additions to
productive capacity or management.w
k) Debtor countries should allow the participation of domestic investors
because to prohibit their participation arouses resentment and political
opposition to economic privileges granted to foreigners. Moreover,
investments by domestic investors are less likely to generate future foreign
exchange outflows.226 Debt swaps might provide domestic industry with
access to long-term financing that might otherwise be unavailable due to
underdeveloped capital markets. Allowing domestic participation will also
facilitate the repatriation of flight capital.2' Finally, domestic investors will
ultimately find a way to participate regardless of restrictions, through
offshore corporations or other means.228
F. Means of Achieving Program Goals
An IFC study evaluated Latin American debt swap programs to
determine the best means to achieve three possible debt swap objectives:
(1) increasing additional investment; (2) channeling investment into high-
priority sectors or regions; and (3) reducing the debt burden to the maximum
extent by securing a larger share of the secondary market discount for the
debtor government.229 The IFC's conclusions are discussed below.23
1) Increasing Additionality231
a) Countries should keep incentive levels high for all eligible investors,
but should prescreen for obviously nonadditional investments,232 because
224. Id.
225. Id. at v-vii.
226. SCHILLING, supra note 136, at 4.
227. Id.
228. BERGSMAN & EDIsis, supra note 217, at 24.
229. Id. at vii.
230. Id. at 23-25.
231. "Additionality" is a tricky concept to define, particularly considering that even if one
investor might not have made the investment without a debt-equity swap, another investor might
have. The IFC study uses additionality to mean that the particular investor would not have made
the investment without the swap program. Moreover, sometimes swap programs might not have
induced the investor to make the investment, but may have influenced the timing or amount.
This can be referred to as "partial" additionality.
232. Some governments try to increase additionality by conducting negotiations with
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some degree of screening potential investments is worthwhile to prevent
round-tripping and to increase additionality. Screening investments for
priority regions or sectors can also be worthwhile, especially to encourage
export-oriented investment. Authorities should not attempt, however, to
screen investments according to their merits, except to weed out egregiously
illegitimate or exploitative projects because the authorities lack the time
and the experience to conduct full-blown qualitative evaluation.3 3 Screening
should be restricted to the extent possible to reduce the impact of corruption
and red-tape.234 Some swap programs tend to restrict the use of swaps for
buy-outs and restructurings on the grounds that they do not involve
substantive improvement in productive capacities. Screening out buy-outs
and financial restructurings will probably prove counterproductive, given
their potential for follow-on investment. Research has shown that buy-outs
and restructurings often lead to improved management or simply allow
the firm to consider future investments and improve its balance sheet. 5
Moreover, most of these transactions are additional and are noninflationary
if the central bank has assumed private debt.236
b) Countries should maintain continuity in the program for a long
period. The projects during the first several months of the program will
have been planned before its inception and thus cannot be considered
additional. However, the additionality of later investments will rise as
investors start seeking investment opportunities to take advantage of the
swap program.237
c) Countries should consider restricting the swap program to export
investments or at least subjecting proposals for export projects to less
stringent screening.
individual investors instead of by allocating conversion rights through auctions. This is probably
a fallacy because governments can always prescreen for obviously nonadditional investments
before holding auctions, and because government officials will never be able to determine exactly
which investments are additional. Thus, they should merely hope to screen out obviously
nonadditional investments. BERGSMAN & Enisis, supra note 217, at 20.
233. SCHILLING, supra note 136, at 26-27.
234. See BEROSMAN & EDisis, supra note 217, at 25.
235. The IFC noted the following example:
A foreign investor was prepared to close down a heavily indebted manufacturing subsid-
iary. Instead, when a conversion program became available, the parent company elected
to use a debt-equity swap to repay the subsidiary's loans. The parent was then able
to find a buyer for the recapitalized company, selling it to a new foreign investor who
had a more specialized knowledge of the industry and who was committed to making
the plant succeed. Although the swap transaction itself did not create new productive
capacity, it nevertheless made the difference between the life and death of the
enterprise.
Id. at 13.
236. Id. at 15.
237. Id. at 11-12.
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d) Countries should also encourage banks to participate in the swap
program, perhaps through investment funds financed with swap proceeds 238
Banks are particularly likely to prefer buyouts, where they generally act
as silent partners or bring in another foreign company to run the enterprise.
Generally banks would like some sort of preferred status, whereby they
limit their risk and agree to corresponding limitations on their profits.239
e) Finally, countries should establish reasonable timing restrictions on
repatriation of dividends and capital.
2) Channeling Investment Into Priority Sectors or Regions
Countries should screen proposals to eliminate low-priority investments,
and should consider creating normal and "super" incentives to apply to
normal and high priority projects. They should avoid creating a "low"
priority set of incentives, because the investments attracted by the lower
grade of incentives are "nonadditional" and deserve no incentives at all.
Attempts to create "fine-tuned" graduated incentives will probably fail to
channel investment into the desired area.
3) Capturing a Larger Share of the Secondary Market
Discount for the Debtor Government
a) Countries should use auctions to set discount rates. Competitive
bidding for debt conversion rights will secure the debtor government
whatever discount rate the market will bear.
b) Countries should allow participation of domestic investors in order
to draw their flight capital into the debt swap program. Participation of
the domestic investors will make the bidding for debt conversion rights
more competitive and thus increase the government's share of the secondary
market discount.
c) Countries should not screen out too many proposals. The fewer
projects which are approved, the fewer investors there are, resulting in
weaker bidding.
d) Finally, countries should not impose new money requirements. Fresh
238. In most debt swaps, corporate investors "want to get rich, while banks want to get
out." The banks are not excited about the prospect of taking on risky equity stakes and would
prefer that any debt swap look more like debt than equity. Banks with a strong merchant banking
tradition have been more accepting of taking on equity. Banks are most reluctant to commit new
money, even in local currency, to an equity investment. Even without a formal new money
requirement, most foreign investment requires at least some machinery or equipment to be brought
in from abroad, which cannot be financed by swaps. Mutual funds in the debtor country are
attractive to smaller banks that lack the resources to select or manage individual projects. The
IFC concludes that greater involvement by banks might be the single best means of achieving
higher additionality. Id.
239. Id. at 8-9.
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money requirements are unpopular with investors and drive down the debt
in the secondary market, thus decreasing the secondary market discount
captured by the government. A government would be better advised to
refrain from new money requirements and to seek the benefits of greater
discounts.'
IV. RuSSIA's DEBT
Russia's transition from a command to a market economy faces daunting
obstacles. While official aid and development assistance are beginning to
trickle into Russia, these resources are limited and will not satisfy Russia's
vast need for investment. Private sources of capital must augment official
programs, but have thus far been reluctant to take advantage of Russia's
investment opportunities because of the uncertain political and economic
climate. An economic advisor to the Russian government warns that
"without finance for new developments, there will be an economic and
political catastrophe."" Perhaps the debt-equity swap can provide a partial
solution.
A. Financing Investment in Russia
Russia's financing requirements in 1992 totalled about $23 billion, 2
with estimates for 1993 running at about $30 billion. 3 The IMF estimates
that the .FSU will require up to $100 billion in economic assistance over
the next four years alone. In real terms, this represents more than twice
as much as Western Europe received under the Marshall Plan." These
huge figures do not include all the capital resources necessary to rebuild
240. Id. at 23.
241. A Few Dollars More, ECONOMIsT,Apr. 10, 1993, at 51, quoting Richard Layard, a
British economist advising the Russian government.
242. The figure includes a merchandise trade deficit of $2-3 billion; a service deficit,
excluding interest payments, of around $2 billion; debt service payments of about $12 billion,
including arrears; foreign exchange reserve accumulation of $1.6 billion; and about $5 billion
to compensate for short term outflows in 1992. THE WORLD BANK, RUSSIAN ECONOMIC REFORM:
CROSSING THE THRESHOLD OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE 49-50 (1992) [hereinafter RUSSIAN
ECONOMIC REFORM].
243. Id. at 50. The IMF estimates that in 1993, Russia will need $22.2 billion for imports
and another $8 billion for debt relief. Steven Mufson, Shake-Up in Russia Worries Western
Advisors and IMF, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1992, at Fl.
244. Nicholas Eberstadt, Wrongheaded Aid to Russia, WALL ST.J., Sept. 1, 1992, at A14.
The figure could, of course, be much higher;, based on German levels of investment into East
Germany, economic aid to the FSU would require more than $2 trillion annually. In a rare moment
of agreement with the IMF, President Yeltsin also chose a figure of $100 billion, which represents
the amount actually injected into East Germany. Alan Riding, 19 Western Nations Give Russia
an Extra 10 Years to Repay Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1993, at A4.
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Russia's shattered economy.45 Privatization in the FSU alone is estimated
as requiring up to $500 billion in the next several years, but Russia and
the other republics must compete against more attractive investment climates
in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia for every investment
dollar.6 Moreover, other sectors of the Russian economy must compete
for investment dollars against the lucrative oil industry, which could
consume $25 billion in capital investment per year. 47 Despite this enormous
need for capital, there are very few sources of financing for investment
projects in Russia, particularly those that do not generate hard-currency. 8
In the short term, foreign direct investment will not play a major role
in financing projects in Russia because most Western companies interested
in investing in Russia are reluctant to commit capital until fundamental
legal, economic, and political issues are resolved.249 Large-scale foreign
direct investment will not occur until Russia succeeds in establishing a
stable business climate.
Russia is also finding it increasingly difficult to get commercial loans
due to its debt service problems. International commercial banks are
unenthusiastic about extending loans to Russia without an official guarantee.
Sometimes even an official guarantee is no help. One banker explained
that banks remain unwilling to take on even limited risk or "put loans on
their books on which they might wind up not earning any money" even
if one hundred percent of the principal and a large portion of the interest
is guaranteed.250 The supply of unguaranteed, voluntary private lending
will likely be "insignificant" for the foreseeable future."'
Russia's domestic banking and credit system cannot begin to supply
the capital necessary to rebuild Russian industry. Although 3,000 commer-
245. One estimate puts Russia's annual foreign investment needs at between $40 billion
and $50 billion. Investment Needs for a New Russia are Mostly Unmet, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 14,
1992, at Al, Column 6.
246. William R. Rhodes, Latin Lessons for the Russian Economy, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21,
1992, at A12.
247. Attali Warns Russia on Stifling Oil Industry, E. EuR. FIN,, Feb. 16, 1993, at 12.
248. Some sources suggest that Russia's investment needs might not be quite so over-
whelming. The Economist notes that the dollar value of the economic output of Russia's 147
million citizens is only slightly greater than that of Singapore's 3 million inhabitants. A Few
Dollars More, supra note 241, at 51.
249. RUSSIAN ECONOMIC REFORM, supra note 242, at 50. U.S. companies have now provided
the largest amount of direct foreign investment in Russia, with approximately $400 million invested
in 1992. In addition, the number of U.S. companies with offices in Moscow has increased almost
ten-fold in the past several years, to almost 300. U.S. urges Immediate Repayment of Russian
Arrears on U.S. Goods, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (B.N.A.), Mar. 8, 1993, at A-7.
250. James R. Kraus, Bankers Applaud Russian Aid, But Remain Cool to Lending, THE
AMERICAN BANKER, Apr. 7, 1992, at 6.
251. RUSSIAN EcONOMIC REFORM, supra note 242, at 50.
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cial banks have opened in Russia recently, most "are not capable of
extending a loan with a maturity of more than 12 months" due to inflation
252and political uncertainties. Although Russian banks control more than
$15 billion in hard currency accounts abroad, they have lent only three
percent of that sum in Russia.253 The development of a viable banking
system in Russia is crucial to the success of its free-market reforms.
The only real source of capital for major foreign direct investment has
been official bilateral and multilateral aid in the form of loans, loan
guaranties, and insurance. The European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) will invest $1.5 billion in Russia in 1993 into joint
projects with other lending organizations which are providing an additional
$8.5 billion.' In fiscal 1992, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation'"
(OPIC) financed between three and five private sector projects worth
approximately $125 million, and provided another $73 million in political
risk insurance. The limited amount of capital available, however, means
that projects in the oil and gas sector and in other export sectors can get
financing only by starving other worthy projects of capital - smaller, riskier
projects or those offering returns in local currency have no access to credit.
Also, both organizations are currently geared toward making large loans
but are hoping to establish enterprise funds to finance small and medium-
sized businesses. Besides these project finance programs, Western nations
and multilateral organizations have extended humanitarian aid and general
economic assistance to Russia, both of which are discussed below.
B. Russia's Debt Problem
Russia's inability to find financing to rebuild its industry stems in large
part from its $80 billion in debt to Western governments, commercial banks,
and multinational institutions. Russia's severe debt problems arose under
Mikhail Gorbachev's tenure during the last few years of the Soviet Union. 56
Soviet financial apparatchiks squandered all of the Soviet Union's foreign
currency reserves while neglecting investment into key export industries
such as oil. The consequent lack of foreign exchange reserves forced the
252. Leyla Boulton, A Fragile Banking System Takes Root, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 13,
1992, at 1, 28.
253. A Western banker commented that if he were a Russian banker, he would do the same,
"because there are few alternatives to placing the money abroad. Lending is risky because you
don't know if the person will disappear tomorrow or whether new legislation will come along
to ruin the project." Id. at 1.
254. Russia: EBRD to Invest $1.5Bn in 1993, NOVECON ECOTASS, Apr. 5, 1993, 3.
255. OPIC is a U.S. government-owned corporation that provides financing and political
risk insurance for U.S. investing in developing countries.
256. Russia's Debt: Burdensome, ECONOMIsT, Apr. 3, 1993, at 74-75.
Spring 1994]
Michigan Journal of International Law
Soviets to vastly increase foreign borrowing, which doubled to $75 billion
in the five years up to mid-1992.257 Gorbachev's ministers foolishly failed
to stagger the maturities on the loans, which are now all falling due
together.258
Russia's debt problems are of recent vintage. As late as mid-1991, the
Bank Vneshnekonomichdskoi Deyatelnosti (Bank of Foreign Economic
Activities, or VEB), which handled most of the FSU's estimated $80 billion
debt, had a flawless debt-service record.' 9 In 1987, the Soviet Union's
sterling credit rating allowed it to successfully place its first foreign bond
issue since 1917 in Switzerland, followed in 1988 by a bond issue in West
Germany at a lower interest rate than equivalent domestic borrowing by
the West German government.2"
Due to huge increases in the amount of external debt and declining
hard currency revenues, the past two years have seen a major liquidity
261problem, causing the VEB to suspend hard currency payments in
December 1991.262 Until 1985, Soviet external debt was made up primarily
of suppliers' credits and commercial bank financing for imports. 263 Foreign
borrowing was tightly controlled. The "perestroika loans" in the late eighties
were coupled with a decentralization of foreign borrowing decisions. In
April 1989, thousands of Soviet state enterprises were authorized to engage
in foreign trade and finance on their own account, without permission from
the center. The short-term debt of these enterprises jumped by $6.5 billion
in 1989 alone. This decentralization of external financing decisions led
to payment problems almost immediately: although the Soviets managed
to service all medium-term debt in 1990, short-term debt owed by state
enterprises fell into partial arrears. 264
Although the FSU is only moderately indebted relative to GDP,26 debt
service payments consumed thirty-seven percent of Russian export earnings
in 1992, consuming valuable hard currency necessary for supporting
257. WORLD DEBT TABLES, supra note 2, at 36.
258. Almost 52% of the total debt stock falls due between 1993 and 1995. Id. at 29.
259. David Fairlamb, Moscow's Financial Crisis, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Jan. 1992,
at 82.
260. ILIANA ZLOCH-CHRISTY, EAST-WEST FINANCIAL RELATIONS 35 (1991).
261. Principal payments jumped from an annual $5 billion to $6 billion between 1985 and
1988, to $19 billion in 1990. WORLD DEBT TABLES, supra note 2, at 29-31.
262. From January to September of 1992, the Russians only paid $500 million of the $3
billion that had fallen due. Sorting Out Russia, ECONOMIST, Sept. 26, 1992, at 98.
263. At the end of 1985, more than $16 billion of the USSR's total of $29 billion in debt
consisted of these trade finance obligations. WORLD DEBT TABLES, supra note 2, at 29.
264. Id. at 31.
265. Until 1989, the Soviet Union's debt burden was below the average of that of moderately
indebted developing countries as a whole. Id. at 29-30.
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economic reforms in Russia.26 Russia has sought to alleviate its debt
problem through rescheduling, but in November 1992, President Yeltsin
stated that short term rescheduling of Russian debt would not be sufficient
and that full-scale restructuring and mechanisms such as debt-equity swaps
would prove necessary to solve the debt problem.267 In July 1993, Russia's
first deputy premier and economics minister, Oleg Lobov, believed that
the debt issue could be resolved in two ways: either by consolidating the
debts with a Russian governmental undertaking to repay them; or by selling
shares of privatizing Russian enterprises to German firms.2"
Estimates vary as to the exact size and composition of Russian debt.
The best guess is that Russia currently owes $80 billion, with $40 billion
of official loans owed to the Paris Club of Western governments,269 $20
billion to the London Club of commercial creditors, 27' and the remaining
$20 billion to multilateral organizations.271 Of the $1.18 billion in interest
owed to banks and official creditors in the first five months of 1991, only
about $50 million was paid to banks, with another $120 million to official
creditors. The unpaid $1 billion in interest was split between banks and
266. RUSSIAN ECONOMIC REFORM, supra note 242, at 55.
267. Patrick Worsnip, Yeitsin Asks Understandingfor Russian Debt Problems, THE REUTER
ASIA-PACIFIC BUSINESS REPORT, Nov. 9, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
268. Russian First Deputy Premier on Russia's Debts to Germany, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, July 22, 1993, at Al.
269. The Paris Club debt can be partially broken down by country: Germany, $18 billion;
Italy, $5.3 billion; the United States, $4 billion; France, $3 billion; Britain, $1.7 billion; Canada,
$1.5 billion; and Finland about $1 billion. G-7 Offers to Delay Russia's Foreign Debt Repayments
at A40; EBRD Could Play Pivotal Role in Promoting Debt Relief Via Swaps, EBRD WATCH,
Mar. 23, 1992, at 1; Eric Beauchesne, Yeltsin Shocks G7 with Offer to Swap Debts for Russian
Industries, THE GAZETrE (Montreal), July 9, 1992, at A11; Focus on the CIS, 21 Bus. E. EUR.
575 (1992).
270. One estimate puts Russian debt to commercial banks at $22.7 billion. Terence Roth,
Western Banks to Roll Over Ex-Soviets' Debt, Again, WALL ST. J. EUR., June 24, 1992, § 2,
at 9. German banks are Russia's chief creditors, holding about $21 billion in debt, of which about
20% ($4.2 billion) is not guaranteed by the German government. The largest commercial creditor
is believed to be Deutsche Bank A.G., Germany's biggest bank, with $632 million in unguaranteed
debt. Ferdinand Protzman, Debt for Equity in Rubles, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1992, at CIO. French
banks hold between $3.7 billion and $4.6 billion in Russia's private debt. Alice Rawsthorn, Russia
and the G7: French Commercial Banks Oppose Rescheduling of Russian Debt, FIN. TIMES
(London), Apr. 16, 1993, at 4.
271. Riding, supra note 244, at 4. Another source places Russian debt at about $70 billion,
with $34.3 billion owed to the Paris Club, $4.1 billion to other official creditors, and $31 billion
with the London Club of Commercial creditors. Russian Debt Talks Stall as Aven Leaves, TRADE
FIN., Jan., 1993, at 20. Other estimates of Western commercial bank exposure is $16 billion.
Sorting out Russia, supra note 262, at 97. One estimate puts total Russian debt as high as $86
billion. Kohl Grants Debt Relief to Russia and Offers Confidence in Yeltsin, N.Y. TIMES INT'L,
Dec. 17, 1992, at A14.
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official creditors, $600 million to $400 million.272 One major problem is
that Russian exporters have not been complying with the Russian
government's requirement that they transfer a certain portion of hard
currency proceeds into official accounts for conversion into rubles.273 Debt
service for 1993 is put at $18.3 billion of principal and interest, most of
which has been rescheduled under a Paris Club rescheduling agreement
reached in April 1993. The debt that is being paid is mainly short-term
bonds and import credits for essential items.274 As part of a more compre-
hensive multilateral aid package, the United States is pushing for compre-
hensive rescheduling and restructuring agreements to include some amount
of debt forgiveness. 275 Germany resists debt relief because it holds more
than half of official debt to the FSU, and its commercial banks hold most
of the commercial debt.276 Moreover, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl
granted $11.2 billion worth of debt relief to Russia in December 1992.277
In July 1993, Russia and Germany reached an agreement on the terms of
Russia's DM30 billion debt to Germany "in the framework of the Paris
Club and London agreement." This figure does not include the DM2 billion
owed to German companies by Russian firms which is not guaranteed by
the Russian or German governments.278 Sources indicate that the German
banks, holding most of Russia's unguaranteed London Club debt, were
272. Banks are interested in punctual interest payments because such payments are necessary
to keep the Soviet debt on their books as performing assets. Roth, supra note 270, at 9.
273. Id. at 9.
274. Russian Debt Talks Stall as Aven Leaves, supra note 271, at 20.
275. The eagerness of the United States to restructure Russia's debt is probably attributable
at least in part to the fact that the United States has little official debt to the FSU other than
in agricultural credits. In early 1993, U.S. official exposure to Russia stood at a mere $4 billion,
only $1 billion of which is subject to rescheduling in 1993. Approximately $3 billion of that
total was in agricultural credits. Sorting out Russia, supra note 262, at 98. At the end of 1992,
Russia was suspended from the USDA agricultural loan guarantee program for defaulting on
payments under the program. Russian chess master and political figure Garry Kasparov argues
that the United States should forgive Russian debt, because the debt issue gives the government's
opponents a political stick to beat it with. Moreover, Egypt's $7 billion in debt was forgiven
for its participation in the Persian Gulf War. What about Russia's 30,000 nuclear warheads?
276. At the negotiations, a German Foreign Ministry official sniffed that Germany's allies
"in Washington, London, and Paris are very gracious in their willingness to spend more German
money" by forgiving Russian debt. Jerry Knight, West Lets Russia Defer Repayment of Its Debt,
WASH. PosT, Apr. 3, 1993, at Al, A18. Even the rescheduling agreement cost Germany about
DM8 billion. Judy Dempsey, After the Summit: Cri de Coeur from Kohl on Burden-Sharing,
FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 6, 1993, at 4. In return for the rescheduling, however, Yeltsin
renounced Russia's DM18 billion claim on Germany for Soviet military facilities located in Eastern
Germany. Russia, Biggest Creditor Agree; Paris Club is Next, E. EUR. FIN., Feb. 2, 1993, at
18.
277. Kohl Grants Debt Relief to Russia and Offers Confidence in Yeltsin, supra note 271,
at A14. German banks still have $11 billion in bad loans. No Rush for Banks in Moscow, E.
EUR. MARKETS, Feb. 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, EEM File.
278. Russian First Deputy Premier on Russia's Debt to Germany, supra note 268, at Al.
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eager for an agreement "at any price," with Deutsche Bank leading the
rescheduling efforts.21 9
Russian debt negotiations have been hampered by disagreement between
Russia and Ukraine over their respective obligations to repay the Soviet
Union's debt.' The terms of the Debt Allocation Treaty of December 1991
require Russia to pay 61.3% of the Soviet Union's debt, and the Ukraine
to pay 16.4% of the debt." Russia has proposed to assume all of the debt
liabilities of the Soviet Union in return for all of its assets and claims
abroad. Although the other republics agreed to this proposal, Ukraine
believed its share of the Soviet assets abroad to be greater than its share
of the debt and refused to sign.282 Moscow and Kiev have been engaged
in intensive negotiations and are set to resolve the issue soon.
The Paris Club has provided what is perhaps the most generous and
useful aid to Russia by rescheduling $17 billion of Russia's $20 billion
in debt service obligations falling due in 1993. This rescheduling relieves
Russia of the necessity to pay out a substantial portion of the money that
it has received in foreign aid to service its debt. Russia's agreement with
the Paris Club in April requires repayment of $1.9 billion of the $17 billion
due to the Paris Club in 1993. This is still a large sum,2 3 but the agreement
with the Paris Club will allow Russia to seek new loans and has allowed
rescheduling of Russia's London Club debt. The agreement also provides
that some of the debt will be converted into tradeable notes and bonds,
which will help develop the secondary market for Russian debt and will
help facilitate debt-equity swaps.
284
Although the standard Paris Club restructuring scheme would have
required Russia to pay $13 billion in 1993, Russia insisted on nonstandard
treatment due to its unusual debt situation in that an agreement for joint
and several liability for the Soviet Union's debt had been signed by the
republics. However, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, only Russia
was willing to assume full liability for all of the Soviet Union's debt. Russia
sought to ensure that all debts incurred in 1992 were being serviced, but
279. Steve Liesman, Debt Rescheduled After Banks Hear Russia's Poverty Plea, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Aug. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
280. Russia's Debt: Burdensome, supra note 256, at 74.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Jeffrey Sachs, a Harvard University professor and advisor to the Russian government,
notes that an equivalent payment for the United States, based on its larger economy, would be
$240 billion. Sachs also referred to Russia as "basically a financially bankrupt country right now."
Knight, supra note 276, at A18. Before rescheduling, another $3.5 billion in London Club debt
payments were due in 1993. See infra, note 287.
284. Liesman, supra note 279.
Spring 19941
Michigan Journal of International Law
was less eager to pay the debt incurred by the Soviet Union in 1991.25
Russia argued that for it to pay much more than $2.5 billion would increase
Russia's budget deficit dramatically, and, more importantly, would force
Russia to divert hard currency-earning exports, such as oil from the former
republics to hard currency markets to earn hard currency needed to service
its debt. This would have devastating economic effects on the other
republics of the FSU. Negotiators eventually agreed to Russia's lower
repayment schedule. In another break from standard policy, the Paris Club
rescheduled Russia's debt before Russia concluded a standby agreement
with the IMF, which is expected by October 1993.286 The Paris Club
agreement does not cover the interest on the $20 billion that Russia owes
to private creditors in the London Club.
In late July 1993, Russia reached an agreement with the London Club
of creditors on terms similar to those of the Paris Club. Russia owes
approximately $24 billion to 600 members of the London Club. Under the
agreement, Russia will repay only $500,000 of the more than $3.5 billion
it owed to Western commercial banks in interest payments for 1992 and
1993. The remaining interest payments have been rescheduled and spread
out over ten years, with a five-year grace period. Russia will repay its
London and Paris Club creditors less than $3 billion of its foreign debt
in 1993, up from $1.8 billion in 1992.2" The $24 billion in principal has
also been deferred and must be repayed in a fifteen year period after a five-
year grace period. In 1994 and beyond, Russia will be expected to make
undetermined annual interest payments.28
Although Russia has now reached agreements with both the London
and Paris Clubs, some nonmember creditors are still demanding payment
in full. On July 30, 1993, South Korea announced that it was expecting
$1.5 billion in debt payment from Russia despite Russia's claims of
"economic difficulty. 289
Even after the Paris and London Club agreements, Russia is unlikely
285. In a speech at London's Stock Exchange in November 1992, Yeltsin argued that the
cut-off date for rescheduling Russian debt should be changed from January 1, 1991 to December
8, 1991, the date the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Germany has strongly resisted such a change
because it would exclude the large sums loaned by them to the Soviet Union in 1991. Yeltsin
proposed that the Soviet Union's 1991 debt should be treated in a special agreement. Yeltsin
Pushes for Rescheduling Of Soviet Debt Owed to the West, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1992, at F9.
286. Leyla Boulton, High Hopes in Russia of IMF Accord, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 7,
1993, at 3.
287. Liesman, supra note 279.
288. Id. French banks opposed attempts to reschedule Russia's $20 billion in private debt
until Russia stabilizes its economy and curbs corruption. Rawsthorn, supra note 270, at 4.
289. One More "Credit of Trust" for Russia, REUTER TEXTLINE, Aug. 4, 1993, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
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to prove capable of servicing its debt without further debt relief. In August
1993, a Russian official revealed that Russia intended to request debt
forgiveness similar to that granted to Poland, where the Paris Club
effectively forgave half of the outstanding debt. Noting that Russia would
have to allocate half of its export earnings for the rest of the century to
debt repayment, the official simply stated that "Russia will not be able to
fulfill its debt obligations.
Besides these restructuring agreements, Russia needs to devise a means
of staunching the flow of flight capital from Russia. Estimates put flight
capital during 1992 at $13 billion, more than the Western aid received by
Russia. 91
In addition to debt reduction, Russia has also received multilateral and
bilateral general economic aid.292 At the Group of Seven (G7) meeting in
Tokyo in April 1993, the Russians received pledges for an aid package
of $49 billion, $43.4 billion of which came in the form of multilateral assis-
tance.2' Although the United States and Japan contributed about $1.8 billion
each to the package, the other G7 members declined to extend additional
bilateral aid because of their own domestic economic problems and their
doubts that Russia could use the aid effectively.294 The G7 aid package
included $4 billion in initial "fast-track" loans from the World Bank and
IMF, $10 billion for long-term stabilization programs, and $14 billion for
structural reforms and essential imports, including $300,000 for an EBRD
small and medium business enterprise fund.295 The United States earmarked
$500 million of its package for investment into privatizing Russian
enterprises, but this was conditioned upon its allies' providing an additional
290. Rich Miller, Russia Seeks Debt Write-Off, MOSCOWTIMES, Aug. 7, 1993, at 2 (quoting
Konstantin Kagalovsky, Russia's representative at the IMF.)
291. Russia's Debt: Burdensome, supra note 256, at 75.
292. The VEB indicated that official disbursements to the FSU (chiefly to Russia) amounted
to $8.5 billion in the first six months of 1992, with another $5.6 billion in undisbursed loans.
About half of these funds were committed by export credit agencies to fund project finance
investment, while the remainder came from other bilateral sources for imports of food, raw
material, and medicine. WORLD DEBT TABLES, supra note 2, at 33.
293. Of the $43.4 billion in multilateral assistance, $28.4 billion was in loans and $15 billion
in Paris Club debt relief. The IMF and the World Bank will fund $4.1 billion between them,
with the first tranche to be disbursed once Russia embarks on a convincing program of economic
austerity. If the policies remain in place, the first tranche will be followed by $10.1 billion for
a full IMF stabilization program and another $14.2 billion for structural reforms and imports.
To Russia, From Tokyo, ECONOMIsT, Apr. 17, 1993, at 50.
294. Germany, Italy, France, and Canada refused to provide more aid, and Britain conditions
$600 million in further aid on Russian cooperation on foreign policy issues. Daniel Williams,
U.S. Presses Its Allies For More Aid to Russia: Washington to Unveil New $1.8 Billion
Contribution, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1993, at AI, A23.
295. Daniel Williams, Rich Nations Approve Aid to Russia, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 1993,
at Al, A18.
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$1.5 billion.29 An additional $50 million is set aside for the establishment
of an enterprise fund to assist in the creation of new businesses.
Western attempts to provide assistance to Russia have been impeded
by debates over whether or not Russia is capable of putting billions of
dollars in aid to good use. The crucial issue has become not the amount
of aid provided, but rather the timing and policy decisions concerning
disbursement.2' In April 1992, the G7 promised Russia $24 billion in aid.2'
A year later, only $13.8 billion had been delivered, along with $2.5 billion
in debt deferral.299 Most of the aid remained undisbursed because Russia
failed to meet economic criteria established by the IMF. Critics demanded
that something be done to assist Russia regardless of compliance with IMF
conditions, while others asserted that any aid given to Russia before
economic stabilization had been achieved would be wasted. Realistically,
stabilization efforts require that foreign financing start flowing "at the
beginning of the credit squeeze, not in the middle of it."'
The IMF's role in dispensing aid to Russia has been controversial.
Western governments turn to the IMF for guidance on the timing of the
disbursement of the various types of aid to Russia. The IMF has been
criticized for blocking meaningful assistance to Russia on the basis that
it has failed to reform its economy enough to make the aid effective. Partly
in response to these criticisms, during the G7 meeting in Tokyo in April
1993, the IMF introduced a special temporary financing facility for Russia
without insisting on the stringent conditions required by a typical IMF
standby agreement.30 However, the IMF does not foresee any more IMF
loans to Russia in the near future until a standby agreement is concluded
and Russia implements a credible set of economic reforms.3 2
The IMF's economic experts are trying to resuscitate the Russian
economy with the same remedies they applied to faltering Latin American
296. The funds would be used to modernize factories, train laid-off workers, and provide
a temporary subsidy to social services previously supplied by the state-owned factories. Williams,
supra note 294, at A23.
297. A Few Dollars More, supra note 241, at 51.
298. Consisting of $11 billion in bilateral support, $4.5 billion from the IMF and World
Bank, $2.5 billion in deferments on official debts, and a $6 billion ruble stabilization fund. Don
Oberdorfer & Ann Devroy, Clinton Said to Have Ordered "Bolder" Ideas on Russian Aid, WASH.
PosT, Apr. 3, 1993, at A18.
299. Bilateral support reached $12.2 billion (exceeding the initial pledges). The ruble
stabilization fund and most of the other IMF loans were not disbursed because Russia failed
to meet IMF economic criteria. Id.
300. A Few Dollars More, supra note 241. at 51.
301. Leyla Boulton et al., West to Reschedule Dollars 1.5bn of Russian Debt: Eve of Summit
Deal Offers Boost for Yeltsin's Reforms, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 3, 1993, at 1.
302. Russia's Debt: Burdensome, supra note 256, at 75.
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economies.' Although Russia and Latin America share similar symptoms,
such as huge debts, high inflation, and shortage of capital, the same
remedies (lower government spending, currency stabilization, open trade,
and price liberalization) have proven much more difficult to implement.
Similar LMF structural adjustment programs failed miserably in Africa,
where billions of dollars in aid have had negligible results.' The chief
problem faced by the IMF is that no one knows whether the remnants of
Russia's command economy will respond to their program as a market or
sernimarket economy would. °5 Meanwhile, the economies of the newly
independent states contracted by an estimated 18.2% in 1992, probably
slowing to 6.5% in 1993.'
At least some economic experts concede that the differences between
Latin America and Eastern Europe will mean a much slower recovery in
Eastern Europe.' One big factor is the different levels of foreign
investment. In 1991, Mexico, Argentina, and Chile attracted $7.8 billion
in foreign direct investment, while the three most promising Eastern
European economies, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, received a
paltry $2.2 billion. A Central and Eastern European investment fund
sponsored by OPIC had to be dissolved after no investors had been found
after a year.308 Investment in the FSU has been "negligible."' At the same
time, trade among the former Eastern European trade partners has
plummeted. The market economy has been unable to expand to fill the
vacuum created by the disintegrating command economy.
Despite these problems, the chief lesson learned in Latin America
remains valid: economic reforms that rely only on stabilization measures
303. Tim Carrington, Eastern Europe's Ills May Defy Usual Cures, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7,
1992, at Al. In Russia, as elsewhere, "[t]here's a feeling that the IMF medicine is killing the
population." Only One-Fifth of Large Russian Firms Seen Being Privatized in 10 Years, BNA
INT'L TRADE REP., Sept. 16, 1992, 1615 (quoting Andreas Gummich, Assistant Vice President
of Deutsche Bank Research, commenting on the unpopularity of IMF reforms in Russia.).
304. The IMF's policies have resulted, however, in its increasing unpopularity in Africa.
Kenya's president recently dismissed the IMF as "dictatorial" and reversed all of the IMF-
sanctioned economic reforms he had recently introduced; IMF speakers are often booed by African
audiences. IMF demands to eliminate subsidies on food and fuel and cut public sector jobs are
very unpopular and politically disruptive, as are charges that the IMF mandates violate the
sovereignty of the debtor country. IMF officials maintain that the failure is not in the plan, but
in improper implementation, and they have occasionally tried to increase a country's commitment
to its program by involving local officials in formulating the plan. Aid For Africa: Nothing to
Lose But Your Chains, ECONOMIST, May 1, 1993, at 44.
305. Eberstadt, supra note 244, at A14.
306. IMF estimate reported in BNA DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Sept. 17, 1992, at 1.
307. Corrington, supra note 303, at Al.
308. OPIC Fund Stalls as US Investors Shy Away, CENTRAL EUR., Dec. 1992/Jan. 1993,
at 9.
309. Carrington, supra note 303, at Al.
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like restricting credit and devaluing the currency are insufficient. Structural
adjustments are essential for economic reform. Privatization, price
deregulation, tax reform, and the creation of a viable financial sector and
capital markets are essential steps only now being undertaken in Russia,
and particular difficulties have been encountered in establishing a well-
defined investment regime and a banking system." ° Russia's heavy debt
burden impedes reform by diverting any increase in foreign exchange to
creditors instead of to furthering reforms.31 Ultimately, no amount of
official aid will turn the Russian economy around. The best that such aid
can hope for is to serve as seed money to stimulate the vast pools of
international private capital.
C. Development of Debt-Equity Swaps in Russia
A prerequisite for any large scale debt-equity swap program is a
secondary market for the country's debt. As of mid-1991, the secondary
market for Eastern European debt resembled the Latin American secondary
debt market at its early stages of development, with debt unstructured and
illiquid.1 There are two key differences between Latin debt and typical
Eastern European debt: First, in Latin America, the main creditors were
U.S. commercial banks, not official creditors; second, Latin debt was largely
in the form of syndicated loans, while Eastern European debt mostly takes
the form of trade credits and letters of credit, with the result that a debt
package with a face value of $20 million might have 150 types of
instrument, each with different components and terms. This makes the debt
harder to price and raises transaction costs. 313 Another difference is that
European, not U.S., banks are emerging as the principal players in Eastern
European debt markets. So far, demand has been somewhat slack on Eastern
European secondary markets because of the lack of debt-equity programs
in the area.
The main similarity in the Latin American and Russian debt markets
is that both should prove to be vehicles for the return of flight capital and
privatization. The secondary markets provide a useful, but not always
welcome, measure of confidence in a government's policies. In early 1993,
for example, Russian debt traded for 171/2 cents on the dollar on the
310. Rhodes, supra note 246, at A12.
311. CLAESSENS ET AL., supra note 89, at 5.
312. Rupert Wright, Debt for Debt, EUROMONEY TRADE FIN. AND BANKER INT'L, Aug.
26, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, TXTNWS File.
313. 14.
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secondary market." 4 While Western banks are eager for the development
of a full-scale Eastern European secondary debt market, activity in mid-1991
was largely limited to debt-for-debt swaps to adjust country risk portfolios,
with perhaps an annual volume of $300 million.1 The London Club
agreement triggered an unexpected surge in the secondary market for
Russian debt. In less than a week after the deal was announced, the price
of Russian debt rose from twenty-eight cents to the dollar to forty-two
316cents. Two days after the deal, one London debt broker reported thirty
transactions in Russian debt, with an average value of $2 million to $3
million.3 7 The main purchasers seem to be North and Latin American
investors who had made a killing in Latin American debt markets.1
Since the VEB froze payments on December 5, 1991, many Western
companies have been unable to get paid under letters of credit with the
bank for goods delivered to Soviet or Russian organizations. The amount
of frozen letters of credit is estimated at $800 million.1 9 Western investors
have proposed resolving the issue through debt-equity swaps, but "confusion
over exchange rates and about land ownership" have thus far prevented
development of a swap program.32 Instead, a presidential decree issued
on December 7, 1992 calls for transforming the VEB deposits into interest
bearing foreign currency bonds with an interest rate of three percent per
annum, and maturities of one to fifteen years. Until the decree, companies
sought release of frozen funds on a case-by-case basis, relying on well-
placed connections. 2'
Yugoslavia became the first Eastern European country to introduce
a debt-equity swap program in April 1989.' 22 The 1988 Polish Debt
Restructuring Agreement makes express provision for debt-equity swaps,
and Poland's agreement with the Paris Club in 1991 reduced Poland's
official debt by fifty percent and included provisions allowing a further
ten percent to be converted via equity swaps. 3 Neither program is currently
314. Leyla Boulton, Trade in Russian Debt Up Sharply in Wake of Agreement, FIN. TIMES
(London), Aug. 5, 1993, at 15.
315. Wright, supra note 312.
316. Boulton, supra note 314, at 15.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Guzel Anulova, Payments & Credits: Frozen Letters of Credit: Latest Developments,
Bus. E. EUR., Sept. 7, 1992, available in, LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File.
320. Id. at .
321. Guzel Anulova, Vneshekonombank to Issue Dollar Bonds, Bus. E. EuR., Feb. 1, 1993,
at 7.
322. Wright, supra note 312.
323. Debt Equity Could Be Solution For Struggling Eastern Countries, EBRD WATCH,
Mar. 23, 1992, at 1.
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operating.
Russia is also considering instituting a debt-equity swap program.3'
At a meeting with G7 leaders in Munich in July 1992, Yeltsin proposed
debt-equity swaps, offering to provide Russia's creditors with land,
buildings, and minerals in exchange for debt reduction. Yeltsin included
the oil sector in the proposal, and Russia was supposedly already in
discussions with one German bank about reducing debt in return for equity
in oilfields in Northern Russia.3" G7 leaders were surprised by the proposal,
which Prime Minister John Major described as "the most important step
of this trip which would make this whole meeting worthwhile."32 6 U.S.
and Canadian government officials expressed doubt that their governments
would be interested in trading their official debt for Russian assets, 27 but
were enthusiastic about making the option available to businessmen.
In early August 1992, Acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar raised the
possibility of swapping Russian debt for property rights and rights to invest
in Russian companies and indicated that Russia had already begun swap
negotiations with Austria.328 Preliminary debt swap discussions have also
begun between Russia and Finland, with full negotiations pending until
Russian legislation is changed to allow debt-equity swaps.329
Russia has also initiated discussions with its Eastern European neighbors
about debt-equity swaps. In 1991, the Soviet Union owed Hungary as much
as $2 billion. Slim prospects of repayment and the desire of Hungarian
companies to retain their footholds in the Russian market led to discussions
on debt-equity swaps, with Hungarian companies taking equity stakes in
Soviet oilfields and other enterprises. Hungary might also consider forgiving
324. At a press conference in September 1992, deputy prime minister Shokhin referred to
debt-equity swaps as "an absolutely new direction from the legal point of view. We are only
at the start of this road." Press Conference by the Vice-President of the Russian Federation Gov-
ernmentAlexander Shokhin on the Russian Federation Foreign Economic Affairs, Sept. 8, 1992.
325. Yeltsin Proposes Debt For Equity Swap, REUTERS, July 8, 1992, available in LEXIS,
World Library, TXTNWS File,
326. Graham Barrett, Group of Seven: G7 Pledges Aid for Russia, THE AGE (Melbourne),
July 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, TXTNWS File.
327. While national governments do not seem keen on reducing Russian debt in return for
equity, the United Nations is considering a scheme that would allow Russia to pay off its debts
to that organization by providing men or equipment for U.N. peace-keeping forces. Polishing
Blue Helmets, ECONOMIST, May 1, 1993, at 39.
328. Gaidar Backs Russian Debt-for Equity Swap, THE REUTER BUSINESS REPORT, Aug.
10, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File. The next day, Austrian finance
ministry officials confirmed that Russia and Austria had signed an agreement providing for debt-
equity swaps in April, but said that the negotiations had stalled on practical details and the
uncertain Russian political situation. Christian Gutlederer, Austria Keeps Russian Debt Equity
Swaps on Ice, REUTERS, Aug. 11, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File.
329. Focus on CIS, Bus. E. EuR., Nov. 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLNWS File.
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portions of Russian debt in return for former Soviet military facilities in
Hungary.3" Czechoslovakia had similar aims.33' In 1992, Czech officials
presented Russia a list of fifty energy and high-tech firms whose shares
would be acceptable to Czechoslovakia in return for cancellation of Russian
debt.332
However, Russia is not only on the receiving end of debt-equity swaps.
It has also proposed taking an equity stake in a Yemeni refinery in Aden
in return for Yemeni debt of $4 billion to Moscow. Discussions have not
yet reached the intergovernmental level.333 Russia is also seeking to acquire
equity in a Ukrainian export gas pipeline and in underground storage
facilities in return for Ukrainian debt to Russia, although Ukraine has
resisted the idea.3
At a conference in London in September 1992, Sergei Vasiliev, director
of the Russian government's Center for Economic Reform, explained that
the Russian government was still debating whether to pursue debt-equity
swaps and expressed the concern that debt-equity swaps have both "good
and bad aspects. '335 Nonetheless, Russia has already approached the IFC
about setting up a debt-equity swap program and Russia has already
received proposals from banks to participate in the swaps.336 The chief
obstacle appears be the general instability of the legal regime and the
political opposition evoked when converting foreign debt into Russian
property.
Multilateral institutions would probably play an important part in any
debt-equity swap program in Russia. The EBRD has proposed that it play
a major role in implementing debt-equity swaps in the FSU. The EBRD
330. Hungarian-Soviet Contacts-A Debt Equity Swap?, MTI EcoNEws, Apr. 9,1991, available
in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File.
331. Czechoslovakia: Investing in Russia, INT'L REP., May 15, 1992, available in LEXIS,
World Library, ALLNWS File.
332. The Czechs remain interested. In a meeting with Russian Prime Minister Victor
Chernomyrdin in July 1993, the chairman of Skoda Plzen proposed that the Russian government
pay off some of its debt to the Czech government with debt-equity swaps. The debt is estimated
at $5 billion. Under the plan, the equity would actually be transferred to Skoda or other Czech
firms. Skoda Offers Debt Solution, Moscow TIMES, July 27, 1993, at 12.
333. Yemen: Moscow Frames Debt-Equity Proposal, MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC DIGEST, July
3, 1992, at 25; Russia and the Gulf - New Investment, Old Debt, MIDDLE E. MAG., Oct. 1,
1992, at 39.
334. Press Conference by Russian Federation Vice-PremierAlexanderShokhin, Government
Press Center, Staraya Ploshchad, Feb. 17, 1993. Russia might become more interested in debt-
equity swaps in other countries as well because many of its loan recipients cannot service their
debt. At the end of 1991, developing country debtors owed the FSU more than $142 billion,
with much of this held by such economic basketcases as Cuba, Vietnam, and Angola. WORLD
DEBT TABLES, supra note 2, at 35.
335. Russian Inter-Company Debt at Two Trillion Rubles, REUTERS, Aug. 21, 1992, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
336. Shokhin Press Conference, supra note 331.
Spring 1994]
Michigan Journal of International Law
thinks that the official debt of Eastern European countries will require a
different approach from the Latin American models and is interested in
developing debt-equity as well as debt-for-nature and other swaps.337 Debt
obligations could be swapped for government undertakings to pursue
environmental and nuclear safety projects. EBRD President Jacques Attali
has proposed that Western governments forgive FSU debt in return for the
dismantling of Soviet nuclear warheads. The EBRD's ability to conduct
prolonged negotiations with the Eastern European governments makes it
well suited for developing and implementing debt-equity swap programs
in Eastern Europe.338
V. DEVISING A DEBT-EQUITY SWAP PROGRAM FOR RUSSIA
What sort of debt-equity swap program is desirable or feasible in
Russia? Although the Russian government's priorities should doubtless
lie in more fundamental problems such as dealing with inflation, imposing
structural reform on the economy, pushing through land reform, and creating
a competition-driven private sector, debt-equity swaps could play an
important role in developing local financial institutions, attracting additional
foreign investment, and reducing Russia's debt servicing obligations. But
are such debt-equity swaps feasible?
The first step in considering whether or not to implement a debt-equity
swap program is to evaluate the economic and political condition of the
debtor country to determine if a debt swap program would be desirable.
A. Objective Conditions in Russia
Russia shares many of the characteristics that made debt-equity swaps
an attractive option for heavily indebted Latin American countries. First,
although Russia's level of debt might be sustainable in the long term, it
has experienced serious liquidity problems that will continue for the
foreseeable future. During its transition to a market economy, Russia needs
to reduce its debt servicing requirements, if not the debt itself.
Second, Russia has been virtually cut off from access to international
investment capital. The only way to finance an investment project in Russia
is through multilateral or bilateral lending organizations such as the EBRD,
IFC, or OPIC.339 Even the projects funded by these investors are concentrat-
ed in a few sectors of the economy such as oil and gas. To rebuild its
337. EBRD Could Play a Pivotal Role in Pmmoting Debt Relief Via Swaps, EBRD WATCH,
Mar. 23, 1992, at 1.
338. Debt Equity Could Be Solution For Struggling Eastern Countries, EBRD WATCH,
Mar. 23, 1992, at 1.
339. RUSSIAN ECONOMIC REFORM, supra note 242, at 51.
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industrial base, Russia must find a means of attracting significant amounts
of foreign investment into a wide range of enterprises.
Third, just as in Latin America, Russian economic and political
instability has led to excessive levels of flight capital as domestic investors
take their investment capital abroad for safe keeping. ° Russia desperately
needs to bring flight capital back into the country to boost levels of
available investment capital.
Fourth, Russia must channel foreign and domestic investment into the
thousands of Russian enterprises undergoing privatization. Without infusions
of capital and new management and technology, the newly privatized
companies will differ little from the remaining state-owned enterprises.
Experience in Latin America indicates that privatization is an excellent
means of implementing debt-equity swaps in countries without developed
capital markets.
Finally, to put foreign and domestic investment capital to effective use,
Russia must develop a viable financial sector and long-term capital market
to grant the nascent private sector access to long-term financing. Consider-
ation of these factors should determine the appropriate goals of the debt-
equity swap program, which are discussed in the next Section.
B. Goals for a Russian Debt-Equity Swap Program
The lessons drawn from the Latin American debt-equity swap programs
suggest that a Russian debt-equity swap program should have four
objectives, in descending order of importance. First, Russia should seek
to attract "additional"' foreign and repatriated flight capital into the private
sector (either privatizing enterprises or start-up companies), especially into
export industries. Second, it should, facilitate the development of a domestic
financial sector and capital markets. 342 Third, Russia should aim to reduce
its debt servicing obligations, and, if possible, the debt principal, to preserve
Russia's limited hard currency reserves for more productive use. Finally,
the debt swap program should play a positive role in an overall effort to
boost investor and creditor confidence in Russia's business climate.
1) Attracting Additional Investment
As noted above, the Russian swap program should emphasize attracting
340. WORLD DEBT TABLES, supra note 2, at 33.
341. By "additional", the author means investment that would not be made without the
incentives offered by the swap program.
342. Guzel Anulova & Jim Nail, Aid for the CIS: Mechanisms Will Be Key, Bus. E. EuR.,
at 185.
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additional investment. Although export industries would be particularly
welcome because of their capacity to bolster Russia's currency accounts,
Russia needs investment into virtually all industrial sectors in all regions
of the country. Moreover, studies of Latin American programs have shown
that debt-equity swap programs are more likely to attract investment in
export sectors than in domestic sectors even without special incentives."
Excessive efforts to channel investments will only complicate the programY4
In pursuing this general objective, Russia should bear in mind three
other considerations. First, the investment must be additional. Some
companies, especially in extractive sectors, are already eager to invest in
Russia with or without any additional incentives offered by a swap program.
The sectors where Russia enjoys a comparative advantage, such as oil and
gas, mineral, and timber concessions, should thus be excluded from the
program or restricted.
Second, Russia should encourage foreign investors to participate in
buy-outs and financial restructuring to reap the benefits of follow-on
investment and infusions of managerial and technical skills.345 Russia's
prime objective should be to get foreign investors engaged in the Russian
economy given that Russia's current investment climate makes many
companies justifiably cautious about committing even minimal resources
to Russia.
Third, Russia should be especially concerned about attracting back flight
capital. 34 Repatriation of flight capital is a strong indication of domestic
investors' confidence in investment climate and has the benefit of reducing
future potential foreign exchange outflows by retaining profits in Russia
instead of sending them abroad. 47
2) Developing the Financial Sector and Capital Markets
Russia's desperate need for a domestic financial sector and capital
markets should be obvious.34 A modem industrial economy simply cannot
exist without such institutions. Although Russia has witnessed a huge
expansion in the number of banks and stock markets, these organizations
need substantial development before they will prove capable of financing
343. BERGSMAN & EDISIS, supra note 217, at 11.
344. See supra note 193.
345. BERGSMAN & EDISIS, supra note 217, at 13.
346. Id. at 24, 26; WORLD DEBT TABLES, supra note 2, at 33.
347. WILLIAMSON, supra note 154, at 65.
348. See No Rush for Banks in Moscow, supra note 277; Konstantin Shtoiko, Stock
Marketeers' Hopes Disappointed, Moscow NEws, Jan. 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, World
Library, ALLNWS File.
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the rebuilding of Russia. Experience in Latin America, especially in Chile,
has shown that debt-equity swaps can play a major role in developing the
host country's financial sector. 9
3) Reducing Debt Servicing
Although Russia has had considerable liquidity problems in the last
few years due to the sudden expansion of its debt and the contraction of
its foreign trade, it should not be considered incapable of paying its debts
in the long term. Ultimately, Russia's vast resources and export potential
will allow the Russian government to satisfy its creditors. During the current
transitional period, however, Russia needs to free up its scarce foreign
currency resources from its debt servicing obligations to put them to more
productive use.
4) Cultivating Investor and Creditor Confidence
Finally, all of these goals should be tailored to achieve the primary
objective of improving investor and creditor confidence in Russia. While
considering measures to restrict investment to "additional" sectors or to
reduce debt servicing obligations, Russia must keep in mind that these goals
are really just means to the end of improving Russia's investment climate
to the point where programs such as debt-equity swaps are no longer
necessary. Moreover, the debt-equity swap program must be only a small
part of an overall legislative and administrative effort to make Russia a
stable environment for business. One observer of Latin America's debt-
equity swaps noted that the programs are essentially an exercise in "buying
friends ... to re-engage [the host country] in the international financial
system.' ,350 However, the debt-equity swap is not a "magic wand" to remedy
all of a country's problems with foreign investors.351
The achievement of these objectives faces daunting obstacles which
experience gained in the Latin American programs can help overcome. The
next Section will discuss the chief obstacles to debt swaps in Russia and
suggest means of avoiding or overcoming them.
C. Obstacles to a debt-equity swap program in Russia
Attempts to devise a debt-equity swap program for Russia must
recognize tensions inherent in all debt swap programs. The program must
349. WILLIAMSON, supra note 154, at 35.
350. 1& at 67.
351. Id.
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be politically acceptable to the Russians while offering significant financial
incentives to Russia, her creditors, and potential investors. Meanwhile, the
program must be flexible enough to survive the ongoing wrenching changes
in Russia and yet have enough structure to prevent it from bogging down
in ill-defined regulations or conflicting legislation. Attempts to reduce
potential for red tape and corruption by making the process transparent
will have the effect of increasing the program's visibility and thus arousing
greater political opposition.
Besides these tensions, there are at least four obstacles to establishing
a viable debt-equity swap program in Russia: (1) the type of debt; (2) lack
of a favorable investment climate; (3) lack of a developed financial sector
and capital markets; and (4) political problems. A properly designed debt-
equity swap program would not only take these problems into account,
but would also present a partial solution to the problems themselves. The
Sections below address these obstacles and possible solutions.
1) Russia's Debt
The composition of Russia's debt presents a problem to the imple-
mentation of a large-scale, debt-equity swap program in that much of its
debt would be considered ineligible under most debt swap programs. Most
debt involved in Latin American debt-equity swaps involved long-term
syndicated loans from commercial banks.3 2 Russia's debt is largely
composed of short-term debt and official credits, neither of which are
generally eligible for debt-equity swaps.33 In June 1992, Russia's total
external debt stock of $75 billion was composed of $62.7 billion in long-
term debt, and $12.7 billion in short-term debt.354 Official credits (i.e.,
credits extended or guaranteed by Western governments or multilateral
organizations) constitute $37.6 billion of the $62.7 billion total long-term
debt. If long-term official debt and the various short-term trade credits are
excluded from the program, $23 billion in long-term commercial debt
remains available for swaps. Thus, two-thirds of Russian debt would be
ineligible under a typical debt-equity swap program.355
Although the composition of Russian debt is atypical, it is not
necessarily a barrier to the development of a swap program. For purposes
of determining eligibility, Russia's debt can be broken down into four
352. Hilton, supra note 71, at 9.
353. WORLD DEBT TABLES, supra note 2, at 36.
354. Id. Short-term debt is composed of tied and untied credits, letters of credit, overdue
interest payments, etc. Id. at 31.
355. Note that Chile had only $14.5 billion in eligible debt for its successful debt swap
program. SWAP GUIDE, supra note 57, Country Chapters: Chile at 1.
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categories: 356 (1) short-term VEB guaranteed debt; (2) short and long-term
non-VEB debt;357 (3) long-term official debt; and (4) long-term commercial
debt.
Initially, short-term VEB guaranteed debt must be repaid on terms
acceptable to the creditors. This debt consists chiefly of short-term suppliers'
credits guaranteed by the VEB, and repayment is very important to restoring
the credit-worthiness of the Russian government. These accounts were
frozen for a long time, but VEB has recently started issuing low-yield bonds
to replace the guaranteed debt. Next, the Russian government should offer
to assume the short-term non-VEB debt of those debtor companies willing
to participate in a debt-equity swap and then sell the debt on the secondary
market. The purchasers of these debt instruments would have the right to
participate in special auctions to bid for equity stakes in the eligible
companies.
The limited size of this debt stock would obviously limit the size of
the swap program, but it would also offer several advantages. First, it would
boost the confidence of creditors, investors, and traders in dealing with
Russian enterprises by giving them value for their short-term debt. It would
also spark interest in the further development of a full-scale debt-equity
program in Russia and provide a valuable test for developing appropriate
procedures. Moreover, this small program, limited to exchanging debtor
companies' short-term debt for an equity stake in those companies, would
be a useful test for the depth of political opposition to debt-equity swaps.
The third category of debt, usually considered off limits for a debt-
equity swap program, is long-term official debt. Official debt is usually
not eligible for debt swap programs because official creditors are generally
not interested in acquiring equity in Russian enterprises via debt-equity
swaps and have fewer incentives to get rid of nonperforming debt by selling
it on the secondary market. Although official creditors generally find it
inappropriate to participate in debt-equity swaps by exchanging their debt
for equity in debtor country enterprises, they could sell the debt at a
discount to investors for use in debt-equity swaps. The U.S. government
already has enacted several programs in Latin America and Eastern Europe
that allow official U.S. debt to be used in debt-equity swaps.35 These
356. Within each category, there will be wide variations in the terms of the debt, i.e., precut-
off versus postcut-off, maturities, etc.
357. Non-VEB debt is debt incurred by Russian enterprises without the benefit of a VEB
guarantee.
358. See the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, 22.U.S.C. § 2430 (1988); the Support
for East European Democracy Act of 1989, 22 U.S.C. § 5401 (Supp. III 1991); the Freedom
for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Market Support Act of 1992, Public
Law 102-511 [S.2532].
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programs could be modified for use in Russia to help achieve the goals
of the debt-equity swap program.
Existing U.S. legislation that allows various types of debt swaps in
Latin America and Eastern Europe could easily be modified to facilitate
a Russian debt swap program. Chapter 7 of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 authorizes debt-for-nature exchanges.359 Section 461 allows the
cancellation of a debtor country's official debt in return for its government's
policy or financial commitment to protect the environment in that country. 360
Section 462 allows the Agency for International Development (AID) to
provide nongovernmental organizations with grants to purchase debtor
countries' debt on the secondary market in order to engage in debt-for-
nature swaps.36' Both types of debt-for-nature swaps are only available to
countries that AID determines are committed to a long-term plan that they
have prepared.362
The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) is a policy initiative
intended to provide debt relief to eligible363 Latin American countries "to
encourage and support improvements in the lives of the people of Latin
America... through market-oriented reforms and economic growth. ' 364
To the extent that Congress has provided appropriations, the president may
forgive concessional debt granted to the debtor country. The unforgiven
portion of the principal must still be repaid in dollars, but interest payments
will be made in local currency into an Enterprise Fund established in the
debtor country. The local currency funds in the Enterprise Fund are to be
used in accordance with the terms of an Americas Framework Agreement
between the United States and debtor governments. An administering body
composed of representatives of the United States, debtor country govern-
ments, and debtor country nongovernmental organizations will accept
proposals for grant assistance for environmental activities. Any grant of
more than $100,000 could be vetoed by representatives of the United States
or debtor countries. 365 The EAI also authorized the sale of official U.S.
debt to purchasers with approved debt-for-nature or debt-for-development
swaps. 366
The Support for East European Democracy Act of 1989 (SEED Law)
359. 22 U.S.C. § 2281 (Supp. III 1991); 22 U.S.C. § 2282 (Supp. Ii 1991).
360. 22 U.S.C. § 2281 (Supp. III 1991).
361. 22 U.S.C. § 2282 (Supp. III 1991).
362. 22 U.S.C. § 2284 (Supp. III 1991).
363. Eligible countries are those Latin American and Caribbean countries that have
democratically elected governments that have implemented appropriate economic and investment
reforms and that support U.S. antiterrorism and narcotics policies. 22. U.S.C. § 2430b (1988).
364. 22 U.S.C. § 2430 (1988).
365. Id.
366. 7 U.S.C. § 1738p (Supp. IV 1992).
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was intended to promote the development of democracy and a market
economy in Poland and Hungary and provided a broad aid mandate. 67
Section 104 of the SEED Law authorizes the President to "take all
appropriate actions to explore and encourage innovative approaches to the
reduction of the ... debt burden of East European countries," and allows
the President to authorize the discounted sale of U.S. government debt
obligations of Eastern European countries to private purchasers if the
obligations will then be converted into equity in a privatizing enterprise,
into local currency, or into policy commitments."
Section 201 of the SEED Act provided for another type of assistance.369
The SEED Act earmarked funds to set up private nonprofit "Enterprise
Funds" to engage in "loans, grants, equity investments, feasibility studies
... and other forms of assistance to private enterprise activities" in the
designated countries.3 70 Congress also enacted the "Freedom for Russia
and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of
1992.,,371 The goals of the program included development of private
enterprise and free market systems and the promotion of trade and
investment in the FSU. FSU countries that have adopted economic and
foreign policy reforms are eligible for various aid provisions under the Act.
The Act extended provisions of the SEED Act to Russia and other FSU
nations.
One provision of the Act provided for the establishment of a nongovern-
mental, nonprofit research and development foundation to provide
opportunities for joint research on high technology civilian applications.3"
Although part of the funding for this foundation consisted of conventional
appropriations, the Act also provided that "local currencies or other assets
resulting from government-to-government debt conversions may be made
available to the Foundation."'373 These debt conversions would take the form
of an agreement "whereby a country's government-to-government or
commercial external debt burden is exchanged by the holder for local
currencies, policy commitments, other assets, .. . or for an equity interest
367. James D. Whisenand et al., Polish Debt: Will Swaps Provide the Key?, INT'L FIN.
L.REv., Mar. 1990, at 33, 34.
368. Id.; 22 U.S.C. § 5414 (Supp. IH 1991).
369. 22 U.S.C. § 5421 (Supp. III 1991).
370. Initially, the only eligible countries were Hungary and Poland. 22 U.S.C. § 5401 (Supp.
m 1991). These Enterprise Funds would be governed by a Board of Directors made up of private
citizens of the United States and the host country, with a majority being U.S. citizens. 22 U.S.C.
§ 5421 (Supp. Ilm 1991).
371. Public Law 102-511 [S.2532].
372. 22 U.S.C. § 5861 (Supp. IV 1992).
373. Id.
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in an enterprise theretofore owned by the debtor government."374 Thus, this
nonprofit, nongovernmental foundation could receive an equity stake in
high-technology privatizing Russian enterprises in return for cancellation
of commercial or official U.S. debt.
Other types of programs are also possible. Some call for debt-equity
swaps to be tied into other forms of aid and for governments to provide
subsidies for participating banks. This aid might not require much in the
way of appropriations, but would funnel large amounts of private capital
into Russian industry.3" One such approach would be to use official debt
as a kind of "matching fund" for private investors that have investment
projects approved by the Russian government. One of the biggest reasons
that many policymakers hesitate to commit greater foreign aid resources
to Russia is that the economy is not ready for untied foreign aid, which
will merely be swallowed up in the economic chaos without any real
beneficial effect on the Russian economy.376 A debt matching fund program,
on the other hand, would channel foreign aid in the form of debt relief
into productive use by tying it to a particular project sponsored by a
Western company. This debt could be either donated or sold at a discount.
If donated, the Russian government would be able to capture much more
of the face value of the debt for itself while still leaving handsome financial
incentives for the foreign investor.3" Such a program would be especially
useful if structured to encourage investment into privatizing Russian
enterprises.37 s
Long-term commercial debt is the final category of Russian debt. This
debt would not be particularly difficult to work into the debt-equity
program. However, it might be useful to limit the amount of debt to pre-
cutoff date debt because this includes most of the unguaranteed commercial
debt and because Russia is not particularly eager to repay this debt, which
was incurred by the Soviet Union.
As outlined above, however, long-term commercial debt would not
necessarily even be necessary in a Russian debt-equity swap program.
Determination of eligible debt should ultimately not turn out to be a major
obstacle.
374. Id.
375. Anulova & Nail, supra note 339, at 186.
376. Eberstadt, supra note 244, at A14.
377. See supra note 93.
378. Many argue that investing in a privatizing enterprise in Russia is more trouble than
it is worth and that green-field or start-up investments are the only way to invest in Russia without
the disincentives associated with most privatizing enterprises. This argument certainly has merit,
but the debt-equity swap program should offer sufficient incentives to induce investment into
privatizing enterprises to keep factories open and help facilitate the development of active capital
markets to trade the shares of the privatizing enterprises.
[Vol. 15:909
Debt-Equity Swaps in Russia
2) Lack of an Investment Climate
Debt-equity swap programs generally perform poorly when the host
country lacks a favorable investment climate.37 9 They fail under such
conditions for two reasons. First, the debtor country authorities cannot
adequately administer the program. Second, even if they could administer
the program, the unhealthy business environment means that few investors
are willing to participate. Even under prevailing conditions in Russia,
however, both of these problems are surmountable.
The question of who should administer the program is of critical
importance. Although the central bank typically administered debt-equity
swap programs in Latin America, the administrative chaos in Russia calls
for the establishment of a two-tier administrative mechanism. On the federal
level, a dedicated government agency should oversee the allocation of debt
conversion rights through auctions. This federal body should also establish
summary screening procedures to determine which investors are eligible
to participate in the auctions. These prescreenings should only seek to
eliminate fraudulent applicants or those trying to invest in ineligible sectors
such as gas and oil.
Once the debt has been sold in the federal auction, it could be invested
by means of a second tier consisting of three alternative investment
programs. Under the first program, investors would bring their purchased
debt to designated regions to exchange for an equity stake in a particular
privatizing enterprise. These regions, or special economic zones (SEZs),
would retain responsibility for choosing and negotiating the eligible
investment projects. Under the second alternative, investors would convert
their debt into shares in investment funds that would in turn select
investment opportunities anywhere' in the country. The third alternative
would be a debt-for-debt conversion for domestic investors whereby they
could convert foreign debt purchased at the auction into gold-backed ruble
bonds issued by the Russian government.
At the federal level, the recently-established State Investment Corpo-
ration (SIC), headed by Yeltsin's former chief of staff, would be the best
institution for handling debt-equity swaps. The SIC's mandate is to carry
out the analysis, selection and implementation of investment projects, and
it will have exclusive control over state-funded investment projects and
investment involving central bank loans.38° The SIC could chair a small
379. Basile, supra note 133, at 56.
380. Russia Sets Up Corporation to Encourage Investment, REUTERS, Feb. 5,1993 available
in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
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joint committee composed of members of the State Property Committee,
State Committee on Foreign Investment, and the Central Bank (or successor
to the VEB) capable of administering the program without opening the
forum to too many contending constituencies.
The role of the SIC would be limited to the administration of central
auctions for the right to convert Russian debt. Besides devising the auction
procedures and setting the ceiling on the amount of debt to be auctioned,
the SIC should establish summary screening procedures to screen out
participants whose investments are fraudulent or clearly nonadditional.81
In the second tier, the auction winners would then use their funds for one
of the three alternative purposes outlined above and discussed in more detail
below.
First, if an investor wished to acquire an equity stake in a particular
enterprise, he could take the debt conversion rights obtained in the federal
auction to the SEZ that was home to the target enterprise. This type of
investment should be limited to SEZs for administrative and political
reasons. There are several advantages to delegating the details for most
aspects of swap transactions to the SEZs. The regional approach is attractive
for three principle reasons.
First, limiting substantive investment project review, negotiation, and
approval to regions will cut out the federal bureaucracy in Moscow and
allow those regions serious about attracting foreign investment to devise
the best methods of doing so. Delegating project review and approval to
regional authorities will help reduce one of the chief drags on investment
activity in Russia - bureaucratic deadlock. Currently, red tape from federal,
regional, and local authorities can stop projects in their tracks. Cutting out
the federal level will allow regional officials greater leeway to choose what
they consider to be appropriate investment projects for their regions. Finally,
regions will be free (within certain limits) to devise their own investment
policies, thus promoting experimenting and competition by ensuring that
regions that devise the most favorable investment climate will attract the
lion's share of investment capital.
Investors should submit investment proposals to an investment board
in the SEZ. Despite the increased risk of corruption and bureaucratic delay,
regional authorities should rely on case-by-case negotiations to settle the
final terms of the debt-equity swap. Otherwise, the results at federal debt
auctions might subvert the SEZ's investment development plan by allowing
the sponsors of especially lucrative projects to outbid everyone else, even
381. No screening would be necessary for investment into the investment funds. The right
to convert debt into equity in the investment funds would be represented by a form of privatization
voucher which could be immediately credited to the investment fund's account.
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though they would have made the investment even without the debt swap
program. Thus, case-by-case procedures should be implemented for
considering individual investment proposals, while investments through
the investment funds discussed below should be converted in special
auctions for holders of the privatization vouchers.
The reasons for relying on case-by-case approval on the regional level
seem sound. Regional officials will know best what sort of investments
their regions need and should be eager to cut through the red tape to make
it happen. Once the auction process is completed, there should be no further
involvement by Moscow authorities. This reliance on regional authorities
also has favorable political consequences, which are discussed below.
The second attraction of the regional approach is that the concentration
of investment into certain regions will allow the business climate in that
region to reach a "critical mass." On a practical level, much of Russia lacks
the infrastructure and general business climate necessary for intensive
foreign investment. One problem immediately obvious to those investing
in Russia is that it will do little good to invest millions of dollars into a
promising facility in the Russian hinterlands. Vast expanses of Russia lack
proper telecommunications and transport infrastructure, proper banking
facilities, rapid access to international markets, and ancillary services which
are necessary for a successful business. Moreover, some regional govern-
ments are lukewarm towards outsiders seeking to invest in their regions
because they fear that a shift in the balance of local political power will
accompany powerful outside investors.
Concentration of investment into SEZs alleviates these problems. First,
they should be located by a port or other major transport facility to allow
development of exports and imports. Second, the Russian government might
find it easier to improve the infrastructure in these regions first, rather than
dispersing development efforts all over the country. With adequate
infrastructure, businesses could move in and hope to operate efficiently,
without worrying about how they will carry out standard business
operations. This concentration of businesses will, in turn, attract more
businesses as companies move in to provide services. Banks and regional
capital markets can develop to provide financing for these emerging small
businesses. Even if oil and gas projects are excluded from the debt swap
program, the energy sector could provide the "locomotive" that will attract
foreign investment in other sectors within a SEZ. While the Russian oil
sector alone might require $25 billion of investment3 2 (which promises
382. Which would be provided by the EBRD, OPIC, the IFC, and leading international
banks.
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quick and lucrative returns 38 3), transport, service, hotel, and other sectors
could also be developed through the swap program.3M
The third attraction of the regional approach is that limiting direct debt
swaps to SEZs has useful political consequences. The political benefits
of delegating responsibility for debt-equity swap investment decisions to
the regions are discussed below.
This first alternative is also feasible. Russian SEZs already exist. In
July 1992, Yeltsin signed a decree on SEZs providing for: (1) Reduced
export duties for certain raw materials; (2) the organization of custom
controls in the SEZ; (3) acceleration of privatization in the SEZ; and (4)
utilization of some privatization proceeds for development and insurance
funds for the SEZ. The decree also allocated federal funds for infrastructure
projects in the SEZs. Particularly important projects include mortgage banks,
duty free areas, and the construction of seaports, airports, and storage and
transportation facilities. 3 5 This decree could be modified to encourage SEZs
to participate in ' debt-equity swap program.
SEZ legislation would have to be carefully drafted to bind regions to
the center. Regions are currently ignoring Moscow's economic dictates,
establishing their own trade policies, customs tariffs, and hard currency
regulations.38 6 Regions' demands for special economic privileges threaten
to undermine Russia's economic future; economic authority remains
undetermined, but several regions have successfully extracted economic
concessions from Moscow to forestall threats of secession from the Russian
Federation. 37 Federal Russian authorities can use the lure of billions of
dollars of potential debt swap funds to impose certain minimal conditions
on the regions to stabilize economic relations between Moscow and the
regions.
383. World Bank Writing New Loans for Russia, Including $500 Million for Oil Industry,
BNA DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Sept. 17, 1992, at d25.
384. Another possibility, not explored here, would be the conversion of Russian foreign
debt into rubles to be used for mineral and oil exploration. The initial stages of exploration pose
the highest risks, and anything that reduces costs at this stage exerts a disproportionate influence
to proceed; moreover, a successful outcome would result in increased export, tax, and royalty
earnings for the Russian government, as well as jobs. Funding Exploration Through Debt-Equity
Swaps, MINING J., May 29, 1987, 418.
385. Interregional Commercial Land Bank Formed, REUTER TEXTLINE, Feb. 22, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. Western shipowners transporting agricultural
aid to Russia report that Russian ports are simply overwhelmed and cannot handle the volume
of aid entering the country. Some U.S. vessels have to wait as long as 40 days to unload, at
a cost of $25,000 per day. Jack Anderson & Michael Binstein, 'Greed Versus Greed' in Russian
Aid, WASH. PosT, May 10, 1993, at C12. Presidential Decree on Special Economic Zones, Fin.
E. Eur., July 16, 1992, at 14.
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This arrangement would also prove beneficial for the federal government
in other respects. The federal government could condition the regions'
eligibility for the program on acceptance of certain tax and tariff measures
designed to enhance federal revenues, and on the establishment of
mechanisms to carry out these measures. By allowing regional authorities
a certain amount of discretion in handling the swap program, the federal
authorities could compare the results of several slightly different programs.
The federal government could avoid a lot of political problems by making
the adoption of a debt-equity swap program optional for the region's elected
officials.
One particularly interesting region would be Russia's Maritime Territory
on the Pacific Coast, which is currently leading the country in the rate of
privatization. 8 The region has the largest number of privatized enterprises
and shareholders of any region in Russia, with the result that only ten to
forty percent of the economies of major cities like Vladivostok and
Nakhodka remain in state hands.389 Most of the privatization activity in
the Maritime Territory was undertaken not by investment funds or banks,
but by enterprise management and workers."9 Such a region could be ripe
for increased participation of foreign investors.
The second alternative in the second tier of the proposed swap program
would be a handful of investment funds that would be free to swap foreign
debt for the shares of privatizing enterprises. These funds would not be
restricted to enterprises operating in SEZs, but could be restricted to holding
a certain percentage of an enterprise's equity and could be prohibited from
investing in certain industrial sectors. The establishment and administration
of these funds probably would initially require the assistance of multination-
al agencies such as the EBRD and IFC, although it would be politically
important to ensure that the funds were primarily "Russian." All domestic
and foreign investors should be eligible for participation in these funds
by acquiring debt conversion rights at the federal debt auctions.
The Russians have already proposed establishing funds in an effort
to "privatize" the $3 billion in privatization aid promised Russia by the
G7 at their Tokyo summit in July 1993."9' This aid will be virtually the
only source of fresh capital for privatizing Russian enterprises, and Russian
privatization officials are keen to keep the aid out of the hands of the State
bureaucrats: "Control of the state is the lethal touch .... The money from
388. See supra note 382.
389. Id.
390. Yelena Ryzhova, Far East Leads the Way in Privatization, COMMERSANT, April 28,
1993, at 12.
391. How Not to Help Bolshevik Bisquit, EcoNoMIST, July 17, 1993, at 64, 67.
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the privatization fund must be lent to enterprises on a market basis. This
money must not be captured by the state. ''3' Reformers hope to set up a
network of thirty regional enterprise funds, with at least ten established
in the first year. These enterprise funds will each begin with $75 million,
half in equity and half in long-term loans.393 Moreover, the investments
would be profit-driven and would work from the bottom up. Analysts
suggest that US$4 billion in such investment funds could give Russia's
free market reforms a real boost.
394
Involving these funds in a debt-equity swap program would require
them to exchange debt conversion rights obtained by their shareholders
at the federal debt auctions for privatization vouchers to be exchanged for
government-held shares in privatizing enterprises. This approach would
work well with the Russian privatization program, which grants workers
and managers large stakes in their businesses, but leaves large amounts
of stock in government hands for eventual sale to private parties. This
government stake would be ideal for a debt-equity swap program.395 Also,
workers would retain a considerable share of the newly valuable equity.
The establishment of these new funds will also allow another type of
debt swap transaction, either as an alternative or a complement to the
approach outlined above. A version of U.S. EAI legislation could be
modified to allow Russia to repay interest on official debt into the funds
in local currency. The Modigliani-Dornbusch approach allows similar
treatment for commercial debt.39
These funds would provide a vital source of credit to Russian enter-
prises. Any privatized Russian enterprise could go to one of the investment
funds to apply for loans to finance investment or imports, but not current
expenditures such as wages. Applicants would complete a standard form
detailing their business plan and, upon approval, would have to bid for
392. Id. (quoting Maxim Boiko, chief of the Russian Privatization Center and a senior advisor
to Anatoly Chubais, Russia's minister for privatization.)
393. Once the enterprise funds are established, private companies (hopefully, but not
necessarily, headed by Russians) will bid for the rights to run the funds. Once up and running,
the enterprise funds will concentrate their investment activities on midsize enterprises to avoid
the inevitable political problems of dealing with the megaenterprises common in Russia. After
ten years, the original investors will be allowed to sell their shares in the funds. The chief problem
is in the attitude of the donor countries, which are wary of committing the $4 billion requested
by President Clinton. They agreed to the $3 billion figure only on the condition that one third
of that is tied export credits, not true privatization aid. These tied export credits threaten to
bankrupt the very enterprises that the privatization aid is meant to assist. For instance, the
Bolshevik Biscuit Factory received a $50 million export credit from Italy to purchase Italian
equipment; factory management has now idea how it will sell enough biscuits to even begin
paying off the loan. Id.
394. A Few Dollars More, supra note 241, at 51.
395. Charles Wolf, Jr., Latin-Style Swaps for Russia, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 1992, at A14.
396. See supra note 101.
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the loans if the applicants' demand exceeded the supply of cash. The interest
rate on such loans would rise as the ruble falls. 7
Besides investing in privatizing enterprises, the investment funds could
provide financing for newly-created private businesses. Perhaps a certain
fraction of investment funds could be set aside to finance employee stock
ownership plans (ESOPs). To boost the political popularity of the debt-swap
program, the authorities could divert a small percentage of the funds into
some kind of pension augmentation fund.
While there would be few if any restrictions on eligible investors for
participation in the funds, the size and scope of authorized equity acqui-
sitions could be regulated. Investment into the funds would be subject to
certain restrictions on eligible enterprises and sectors and maximum
percentage of shares.
The third alternative in the second tier of the proposed debt swap
program involves the conversion of foreign debt into ruble-denominated,
gold-backed bonds. In October 1993, the Russian Ministry of Finance
introduced gold-backed bonds with a maturity of one year and an interest
rate linked to that offered by Russia's largest savings bank. The attraction
of the gold bonds, however, is that upon maturity, investors may redeem
the bond for either ten kilograms (twenty-two pounds) of gold or its ruble
equivalent (calculated using prices fixed in London). The Ministry ultimately
intended to sell 10,000 gold bonds, backed by 100 tons of Russian gold.398
A modified version of these bonds319 could be offered to domestic investors
as an alternative to participation in debt-equity conversions. Although the
amount of bonds would be limited by the amount of gold available and
the inadequacy of Russian capital markets, significant amounts of Russia's
foreign debt could be exchanged for these ruble denominated instruments
by allowing Russian investors to bid for the gold bonds using face values
of external debt purchased on the secondary market. This aspect of the
program should be limited to Russian citizens to maximize the amount of
returning flight capital and to restrict the amount of Russian gold leaving
the country.
Even if the two-tier mechanisms discussed above for administration
of the program are successfully established, as noted at the beginning of
this Section, it does not necessarily follow that investors will be interested
in participating. The investment climate in Russia is such that few investors
will be attracted without the most generous of financial incentives. Property
and contract rights are difficult to ascertain and enforce; nor can investors
397. A Few Dollars More, supra note 241, at 51.
398. Golden Bonds EcoNobs'T, Oct. 23, 1993, at 98.
399. For instance, a longer maturity date would be necessary.
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be sure of their ability to repatriate their profits. Investors are wary of the
unstable economic and political situation in Russia, with its disintegrating
distribution system, "archaic technology, cumbersome bureaucracies,
currency uncertainties, the lack of legal protection, debt burdens of local
companies, the lack of incentives.., for workers, and woefully inexperi-
enced local managers."" Even under normal circumstances, it is not easy
to find investors "to help privatize entire industries with productivity
standards that are fifty to seventy percent below Western levels. ' Another
Western businessman explains that investors "are all standing here with
plugs in our hands, looking for an outlet to plug into, but the infrastructure
is all wrong."" Basically, most Russian enterprises would not attract foreign
investors unless the proposed investment could hope to generate significant
hard currency revenues; EBRD officials report that Western companies
often lose interest in a project when asked to contribute their share of the
financing.f 3 Helmut Schmidt, former German chancellor, estimates that
it will be fifty years before Russia achieves economic and political
stability.4 Mr. Schmidt concludes by stating that "[i]f I were the head of
a company or a rich man, I wouldn't invest a penny there."4 5
Russia's investment situation is not hopeless, however. First, the
concentration of investment into SEZs and the greater ability of regional
officials to push through investment projects will improve the business
climate to a certain extent. Moreover, there are Western businesses ready
to invest in Russia right now, despite the considerable risks. These
companies are eager to invest despite the economic conditions in Russia
because they seek to invest all over Eastern Europe based on strategic
considerations, not merely return on capital. The chairman of Daimler-Benz
AG recognizes a need to establish a presence in the Russian market, despite
the "daily risk of catastrophes.., social unrest, economic disaster, or even
a coup." 0 Major Western companies such as Coca-Cola, McDonalds,
Chevron, and others have entered the Russian market for the long haul.'
Aggressive smaller firms have also taken the plunge, sensing big rewards
for those on the ground first. At least one German bank, Dresdner Bank,
has proposed to accept portions of Russian interest payments in rubles if
400. Terence Roth, Daimler's Chief Sees Risks in Russia, Reflecting Caution of Western







407. Laurie Hays, Building a Market, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 1993, at Al.
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these rubles could then be invested in Russian companies.4 Wolfgang
Roller, chairman of Dresdner Bank's management board, submitted a
proposal to the steering committee of the banks in debt negotiation with
the Russian government.4°9
Although a debt swap program would not single-handedly alleviate
all of Russia's problems in attracting investment, it is not meant to. Rather,
the debt swap program would comprise just one component of an overall
policy and would offer valuable incremental investment incentives.
3) Lack of a Financial Sector and Capital Markets
The third major obstacle to the development of a debt-equity swap
program in Russia is the lack of a financial sector and capital markets. The
financial sector in Russia is currently incapable of supplying credit to the
emerging private sector. As of 1992, there were over 1,600 banks in Russia,
but almost all of them are small and undercapitalized or owned by groups
of enterprises which use them to get cheap credit." ° The Soviet banking
system was used not as a means of providing loans to credit-worthy
enterprises, but as "a vehicle for financing loss-making firms... Central
Bank credit [was] funnelled through the banking system to loss-making
enterprises."4 1
Banking supervision and the financial infrastructure are also hopelessly
inadequate, leading, respectively, to "incestuous and often fraudulent lending
practices" and illiquidity.412 Moreover, the uncertainty and misinformation
under current economic conditions prevent a bank from distinguishing
creditworthy from uncreditworthy enterprises. The World Bank concludes
that the "current structure of the financial system discourages market-based
credit decisions and perpetuates the existence of fragile financial institutions
with concentrated loan portfolios and substantial outstanding credits to
unprofitable firms. 413
Although complete reform of Russia's financial sector will take years,
Russia must begin creating a market-based financial system to provide credit
to the emerging private sector. While Russia writes new banking laws and
regulations and upgrades accounting and supervisory standards, new
408. Peter Torday, Novel Proposal to Ease Soviet Debt, INDEPENDENT, Apr. 10, 1992,
Business and City Page, at 27.
409. Wolfgang Munchau, German Callfor CIS Swaps, THE TIMES (London), Aug. 5,1992,
Business section at 17.
410. RUSSIAN ECONOMIC REFORM, supra note 242, at 109.
411. Id. at 106.
412. Id. at 113, 115.
413. Id. at 109.
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financial institutions are beginning to emerge. Some joint venture banks
are already thriving in Moscow, although they still rely on banking services
rather than lending for most of their profits.414
To promote the further development of the Russian financial sector,
the World Bank advocates the development of an elite group of banks
known as International Standard Banks (ISBs) that would provide Russian
and foreign clients with enhanced financial services. These banks would
receive special banking privileges in return for conformity to international
banking standards.415 In return for meeting capital adequacy standards and
complying with international accounting standards, annual external audits,
insider transactions provisions, and acquiring a Western bank or technical
or joint venture partner, the ISBs would be granted privileges such as an
"ISB" designation, and lower discount rates and reserve requirements. 416
The debt-equity swap program could facilitate this process by requiring
that investors retain an ISB to represent it during the swap transaction. The
resultant fees would prove a lucrative source of revenues for the new
banks. 417 Banking personnel would also receive valuable transactional
experience.
Similarly, capital markets in Russia remain woefully inadequate. About
ten specialized stock markets exist.418 Although trading volume has been
steadily increasing, it remains low and trading is generally purely speculative
in nature.49 The lack of developed capital markets hinders a potential swap
program by precluding the use of long-term local currency instruments to
"sterilize" the monetary impact of the swaps, and by denying investors
a liquid means of disposing of their equity stakes.
Nonetheless, important steps have been taken, as the stock markets
have established nascent brokerage systems which will facilitate further
development of capital markets. 420 The investment funds envisioned under
the debt-equity swap program would prove an excellent catalyst by
414. One Western banker explains: "How does IMB (international Moscow Bank, a joint
venture) make its money? It takes dollar deposits and doesn't pay any interest on it. Not only
does it do that, but it charges you coming in and charges you going out. That's banking!" No
Rush for Banks in Moscow, supra note 277.
415. RUSSIAN ECONOMIC REFORM, supra note 242, at 110.
416. Id.
417. During the Chilean debt swap program, Chilean banks earned 25% of their profits
by fees and commissions generated by swaps. U.N. GUIDE, supra note 51, at 82-84.
418. The busiest stock markets include the Siberian Stock Market and those in Moscow,
St. Petersburg, Nizhni Novgorod, and Yekaterinburg. Konstantin Shtoiko, Russian Stock
Marketeers' Hopes Disappointed, Moscow NEWS, Jan. 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, World
Library, MOSNWS File.
419. Between September and December 1992, trade volume doubled in monetary terms
every month, reaching 23 million rubles by December. Id.
420. Id.
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stimulating much greater demand for the shares of privatizing enterprises
and by providing a body of professional fund managers.
It is critical that the funds control large cash reserves as well as the
privatization vouchers distributed through the central auctions because the
vouchers do precious little for the target firm other than dilute control.
Target firm management will justifiably remain unenthusiastic about outside
investors until they can provide capital infusions to expand capacity. For
this reason, it is imperative that the funds receive either the billions
promised by the G7 or the right to receive interest payment on foreign debt
in local currency, as envisioned by the EAI or Miller-Modigliani approaches.
The speed and scale of Russia's privatization program has been
phenomenal. By July 1993, more than 2,300 medium to large enterprises,
employing fifteen percent of Russia's workforce, have been privatized
through voucher auctions. By 1994, 6,000 enterprises will have been
privatized. 1
A debt-equity swap program in Russia would not be desirable or
possible without a sizable privatization effort. Countries such as Russia,
without well-developed domestic financial markets to absorb long-term
local currency denominated instruments to "sterilize" the monetary effect
of the swaps, must try to limit the monetary effect by implementing the
swaps in conjunction with a privatization program and to impose ceilings
on the amount of debt to be converted. At the same time, the debt-equity
program can serve as a catalyst to the privatization effort by stimulating
foreign interest in Russian equity and by providing "captive" investment
capital that must be invested in privatization directly or via investment funds
to have any value and by increasing trading volume at Russia's nascent
stock markets.
4) Political Problems
Despite the considerable difficulties outlined earlier, the greatest obstacle
to a debt-equity swap program in Russia is political. In Latin America,
swap programs generally aroused political opposition from nationalist
legislators or labor representatives who feared foreign economic domination
and who were critical of investment incentives granted to foreigners.'
Attempts to grant domestic investors equal access to the debt swap program
can result in charges that speculators or crooks are using the swaps to
violate currency exchange restrictions to launder their ill-gotten gains. Swap
421. The Revolution Begins, ECONOMIST, July 3, 1993, at 69.
422. Hilton, supra note 71. at 11.
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programs can also lead to allegations of official corruption or complaints
that the swaps are fueling inflation. Political passions are easy to arouse
when the participating investors are large multinational corporations or
banks, particularly when they are perceived to be snatching up the
commanding heights of the debtor country's economy at bargain basement
prices.423
These problems must also be addressed when devising a Russian debt-
swap program. There are several possible means of resolving the most
significant political problems. One such solution involves the scale and
visibility of the program. The best way to reduce opposition to a debt-equity
swap program is to keep it small and inconspicuous, in terms of the sheer
volume of swap transactions, the procedures followed, and the sorts of
eligible investment. Although Russia's debt problem is pressing, primary
emphasis on a pell-mell reduction of Russia's debt would be short-sighted
and could court a disastrous political backlash by wresting control of the
swap process out of the hands of the Russian authorities. A test program
with the short-term debt or limited amounts of official debt would provide
a good measure of the degree of political opposition to be expected under
a full-scale swap program.42
The program's public profile will be determined to a great extent by
the procedures used to convert the debt. Auctions are often hailed as the
best means of converting debt, because the authorities have less discretion
to interfere in the investment process. However, this lack of control over
the use of swap funds can become a political liability if investors start using
the swap program for speculative ends or to engage in nonadditional
investment.
Even if case-by-case negotiations are used, investors would prefer that
they be public to the greatest extent possible. Although debt swap
conversion procedures would ideally be fully transparent, transparency
greatly reduces the discretion of the authorities to encourage additional
investment by offering certain investors higher incentives and opens the
program to greater public inquiry and criticism. Focus on creating additional
investment will allow the authorities more control and also allow the
program to maintain a much lower profile.
Another means of reducing the profile of the program is to limit eligible
investment sectors or the type of investment. Giving foreign investors
423. The Economist reports that someone seeking to invest $730 million could buy Cray
Research (a U.S. supercomputer manufacturer), Vickers (a prestigious British engineering firm),
or about half of Russia's manufacturing industry. Bargain Debasement, EcONOMIsT, May 8,
1993, at 79.
424. The Bulgarian government has established a debt management team that proposes to
establish debt-for-nature swaps for use as a "lightning rod" to raise debt-equity swap issues.
Sung & Troia, supra note 211, at 35.
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special incentives to undertake nonadditional projects justifiably leads to
charges of allowing foreigners to dominate the economy at bargain basement
prices. Sectors most likely to attract nonadditional investment must be
excluded from the program. The extractive industries, such as oil, minerals,
and lumber, would be the most obvious exclusions. The exclusions may
or may not be extended to industries and enterprises ancillary to these
industries.425
Another possibility is to limit debt-equity swaps to projects in the export
sector. Studies have shown that investment directed toward the domestic
sector is motivated more by strategic business reasons than by the financial
incentives of the swap program.4' In other words, these investors enter
the Russian market because they feel that they need to enter the Russian
market, and swap incentives play little role in the decision. Investments
directed at the export sector are more likely to be attracted by financial
incentives, particularly those offering an up-front discount that will reduce
the initial size of the investment and give them a cost advantage in world
markets. Without swap incentives, these investors could well decide to
locate the project in a different country. In light of Russia's vast need for
all sorts of investment, export-oriented projects should perhaps be
encouraged, but not at the expense of prohibiting all investment into
domestic sectors.
This conclusion leads to the related question of whether buy-outs and
restructuring should be allowed. Although these types of investment are
criticized for not adding new productive capacity, most investors are
currently very wary of entering the Russian market and should be allowed
to test the waters with a minority equity stake, particularly as even these
investments generally lead to follow-on investments that increase productive
capacity.427 At least initially, there is little point in restricting the size of
equity stakes.
Still another solution to the problems discussed above involves the
inclusion of domestic investors in Russia's debt-equity swap program, for
both economic and political reasons. First, the huge scale of Russia's capital
flight problem must be addressed because domestic investors need an
incentive and a mechanism to bring this money home for investment in
Russia. Second, restricting the program to foreign investors would be
particularly unpalatable to Russians, who are very sensitive to foreign
penetration of their economy. Moreover, if the program is attractive,
425. With perhaps the best policy being to allow swaps for these kinds of companies for
a limited period of time or for a limited number of companies.
426. B ERGSMAN & EDISiS, supra note 217, at 11.
427. Id. at 12-14.
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domestic investors will participate in any event through off-shore companies
or other subterfuges. It is better to have their participation above-the-board.
The participation of domestic investors leads directly to another
potentially serious political problem. The recent expansion of economic
activity in Russia has fuelled the creation of a new class of wealthy
traders, speculators, and shady characters. Russians tend to view members
of all of these classes with suspicion and resentment, often loosely
referring to them as their mafia. The mafia's participation in the swap
program would do little to increase its popularity and would become a
political issue in its own right. There is little the government can do to
limit the participation of the actual crooks without imposing a chilling
effect on the participation of legitimate Russian businessmen. The only
thing the government could really do is to make considerable efforts to
publicize the most favorable examples of participating Russian investors.
Another aspect of the potential political problems which a debt swap
in Russia may cause involves inflation. The possible inflationary effects
of debt-equity swaps often cause considerable political opposition. Even
if the inflation is really due to fundamental macroeconomic policies rather
than the swaps, swap opponents can pin the blame on the debt-equity
swap program. A properly structured, debt-equity swap program in Russia
could be implemented without a significant rise in the rate of inflation.
The most obvious means of precluding inflationary effects is to refrain
from printing the rubles necessary to exchange for the foreign debt
instruments. This could be done by relying on the privatization scheme
to provide most of the assets to be swapped. Instead of handing over
rubles for investment, the Russian government could transfer to the
investor equity in privatizing state enterprises. No increase in Russia's
money supply would result.428
Another common means of preventing inflationary effects is to issue
long-term ruble bonds with staggered maturities in exchange for the
foreign debt instruments.429 Russia's lack of developed capital markets
and the lack of creditor confidence in Russian long-term bonds would
probably make this option unavailable in Russia.
Finally, an IFC study concluded that swap programs might end up
financing nonadditional investment or have inflationary effects, but cannot
do both.430 The simple reason for this is that a nonadditional investment
project, with its potential inflationary effects, would be incurred even
without the swap program. Only programs that attract investments that
428. WILLIAMSON, supra note 154, at 64.
429. Id. at 42-43.
430. BERGSMAN & Emsis, supra note 217, at 32.
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would not otherwise have been made would have inflationary effects
attributable to the swap program.
Finally, there would be several political benefits to delegating re-
sponsibility for the program to the regions. First, both the federal and
regional governments could claim credit for the beneficial aspects of the
program while pointing the finger at the other for the negative aspects.
The federal government provides the means to implement the program,
but the regional officials actually administer it.
Holding regional officials responsible will help reduce the national
political impact of any corruption that arises. National officials can blame
the region for appointing improper personnel to run their program.
Moreover, the regions will be more receptive to any program that they
have a greater role in implementing. Different regions will be able to
formulate different programs to suit their needs. Moscow can set certain
strict parameters for the program while leaving the details to the regions;
regions will be much less likely to ignore such an initiative from Mos-
cow. Also, regions will be free to opt out of the program if elected
officials there feel that the region does not want or need foreign invest-
ment. If the program proves successful, regions will seek to participate
on the initiative of regional leaders. Regions will compete to appear most
attractive to foreign investors.
CONCLUSION
A debt-equity program is feasible in Russia if limited in the amount
of eligible debt, the type of eligible investment, and eligible geographic
area. Such a program will obviously have a limited impact, but debt-
equity swaps are merely one arrow in a government's quiver of economic
and foreign investment policies. Substantial amounts of foreign invest-
ment will ultimately depend upon the development of an overall favorable
business climate, not on the effects of a debt-equity swap program.
Nonetheless, a debt-equity swap program would provide a valuable
means of stimulating the flow of investment capital, the development of
capital markets, and the reduction of debt servicing obligations. After
introduction of a pilot program, the program could be expanded or quietly
dropped without further development Ideally, the program would serve
as a catalyst for the development of private enterprise in Russia.
In conclusion, a debt-equity program should be established because
Russia needs to pursue all available means of attracting investment capital
during its transition to a market economy, and debt-equity swaps will
allow Russia to advance simultaneously towards several critical objec-
tives.
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